PREFACE

What does it mean to belong to a community? How is membership conceptualised and how is it construed in actuality? In what way are the position of outsiders negotiated and the cohesion of a community secured? These questions touch upon some complex and important issues that are often focus of public debate. Surprisingly, they are rarely tackled explicitly by those working on Athenian society – often it is implicitly assumed that political participation was the dominant aspect defining insiders (citizens) from outsiders (non-citizens). This book, however, derives from the notion that the Athenian polis should not be understood as a city-state run by legally privileged and politically active men, but should rather be approached as a social community consisting of the people who on account of their Athenian descent were expected to participate in all aspects of polis life, in that way collectively securing the well-being of the group.

From fragments of Pericles’ famous citizenship law of 451/0 we know that from that year onwards only those born of two citizen parents would count as citizens. Unfortunately, no clear definition of what this Athenian citizenship entailed survives from classical Athens. Still, in many ancient sources we find the statement that membership of the Athenian polis consisted of active participation in the public life of the Athenian community, of sharing in the polis (μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως), often further specified as sharing in the religious obligations of the polis (μετέχειν τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ὁσίων). In these sources the Athenian polis is, in short, presented as a participatory community, membership of which consisted of active participation in the polis, perhaps most importantly in polis religion. From that view it becomes interesting, not to say necessary, to reconsider the position of a particularly prominent and important group in the Athenian polis, namely free foreign residents, who in the course of the fifth century were gradually included in the public life of the polis as ‘metics’, most notably in Athenian polis religion, and who on that account should, at least to a degree, be considered members of the polis.

Exploring this notion of the Athenian polis as a religious and participatory community – which to some extent has already been proposed for archaic Attica by several, mostly French structuralist scholars – the main thesis of this book, which deals with the position of immigrants in classical Athens, is twofold. First it proposes that by including a group in their official rites the Athenians were incorporating that group into their polis community and displaying and reaffirming that incorporation and therewith the sustained cohesion of the entire group on a regular basis. Although the unifying features of a shared religious system are commonly embraced, the ramifications are only rarely fully appreciated by those dealing with the Athenian polis. I argue that by including free foreign residents as metics in several polis rites these metics were accepted as members of the Athenian polis community
Secondly, it is argued that by stipulating differences in participation, in this case in the context of polis religion, the Athenian demos could differentiate social groupings from and in connection to each other. By stipulating, for instance, differences in the portions of sacrificial meat allotted or dress codes, what groups were included in or excluded from certain festival events, the order of participants in a procession, et cetera, a variety of polis memberships could be defined and displayed in public, each with its specific qualifications and specific roles to play in the polis. Ritual differentiation was thus instrumental in the carving out, displaying and (re)affirming of the constituent parts of the polis and the (re)creation of identities and hierarchies. Combining these two strands, this book deals in detail with how the differentiated participation of immigrants in several aspects of Athenian polis religion resulted in 1) the gradual incorporation of this group into the Athenian polis community and 2) the on-going articulation of a separate metic status in relation to the other members of the polis. In this way, I hope to arrive at a better understanding both of the Athenian polis as a religious and participatory community and of the ways in which the demos conceptualised a status for the immigrants in their midst.

I feel very fortunate to have been given the opportunity to work in the context of the project on ‘Citizenship in classical Athens’ at Utrecht University, with project leader Josine Blok and funded by The Dutch Research Council (NWO), and of which this book is one of its many offsprings. Two persons have been particularly important in that context for their support, comments, and discussions: Josine Blok and Stephen Lambert. In Utrecht I furthermore felt greatly supported by my direct colleagues, Floris van den Eijnde and Lina van ’t Wout, and later Saskia Peels, who were all working on the same project. Combining the perspectives of an archaeologist, philologists, ancient historians and an epigraphist, we came to sharpen our views on the social role of religion in ancient Attica in a unique way. In addition, I want to thank my current colleagues at the University of Groningen (The Netherlands), and in particular Onno van Nijf and Babette Hellemans, who both in their own way have always greatly supported me in continuing my research on μετοικία, and on the dynamics of the ancient Athenian community in general. For this book, the critical observations of Nick Fisher and Historia’s anonymous readers of my manuscript were also highly beneficial. Finally, for always supporting me in any way possible, I want to thank Anke Muilenburg, Tiemen Rozeboom, and my exemplum in academia ever since I was little, Leen Spruit. Wrapping up this preface, I want to remind the reader that any remaining errors, whether typos or wanderings in the woods, are my own.

Referring to Greek names and terms I follow the common Latin transliterations and use those versions as can be found in the ninth edition of Liddell and Scott’s Lexicon. Only with less familiar persons, found, for instance, in the many inscriptions discussed in this book, I use a more literal transcription of their Greek names.
translations of literary texts derive from the Loeb series, except where it is stated otherwise. The translations of the epigraphical material are my own, except where it is stated otherwise.

*Sara Wijma*
INTRODUCTION:
DEFINING POLIS MEMBERSHIP

Si l’on veut donner la définition exacte du citoyen, il faut dire que c’est l’homme qui a la religion de la cité

Fustel de Coulanges, *La cité antique* (1864)¹

DEFINING THE POLIS AND ITS MEMBERS: A NEW PARADIGM

Since the nineteenth century the classical Athenian *polis* has most often been equated with its democratic constitution and the adult male Athenians who, based on their Athenian descent, had the right to spend their days on the Pnyx, in the courts or on the battlefield. As a consequence of this institutional and predominantly political perspective, modern scholars usually exclude all those who were not male, not adult, or not Athenian from the *polis* community. Women, slaves, children, and immigrants – in most modern accounts of the *polis* they are silenced, kept indoors, or never let in. At best, these outsiders had to some degree facilitated the rise of Athenian democracy and supremacy by reducing the citizens’ workload and by representing the ever so useful ‘others’ against which the image of a male elite club could be articulated.² In short, the world of the *polis* was the world of the *polites*, the male Athenian citizen, who received his citizen status at birth and several concomitant rights at the age of eighteen and whose main and defining concerns were with running and protecting the *polis*.

Influenced by the modern, liberal interpretation of citizenship as a privileged juridical status protecting the individual against a malignant state – and perhaps also by the derivation of our word ‘politics’ from the Greek word πόλις – this political view of the *polis* and its members is eagerly supported by referring to Aristotle’s *Πολιτικά* (literally ‘Things concerning the *polis*’) 1275a-1278b, where the philosopher tries to give a definition of the full members of the Greek *poleis*, the πολίται – a daunting task, as ‘people do not all agree that the same person is a citizen’ (1275a). Typically, Aristotle first establishes several criteria that, in his eyes,

¹ N. D. Fustel de Coulanges, *La cité antique; étude sur le culte, le droit, les institutions de la Grèce et de Rome* (Paris 1864) 246.
can *not* be used to define a πολίτης, like place of domicile or sharing a common system of justice. As ambiguity concerning the division of political offices was the main cause of contention among those living in the *polis*, resulting in *stasis* in many cases, Aristotle states that (ideally) ‘a citizen pure and simple is defined by nothing else so much as by his participation in judicial functions and in political office’ (πολίτης δ᾽ ἁπλῶς οὐδὲν τῶν ἄλλων ὁρίζεται μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μετέχειν κρίσεως καὶ ἀρχῆς- 1275a). It is not difficult to see how this definition leads to the political interpretations of *polis* and citizenship that are commonly found in our textbooks and reference works.

In the past decades, however, several scholars have expressed a growing discomfort with the understanding of the *polis* as a political community and with the modern tendency to uncritically apply Aristotle’s theoretical model to the classical (Athenian) *polis*. In an important article promoting ‘a new paradigm of Athenian citizenship’ Philip Brook Manville convincingly questioned whether Athenian citizenship was really such a clearly defined juridical status representing individual rights that were aimed to protect the individual against an impersonal “state”, and whether we are correct in understanding the *polis* and Athenian citizenship primarily through institutional and political contexts. The *polis* and its members were usually not as neatly defined as Aristotle presents it to be – even Aristotle implicitly admits to this. As Edward Cohen has argued a bit too fervently: the lines between the different inhabitants of the Athenian “nation” were not as sharply drawn according to a fixed set of (juridical) criteria as we believe or want them to be. In fact, it seems to have been this characteristic fuzziness of the Greek *polis* communities, ultimately defying a comprehensive definition, which Aristotle was trying to tackle.

Do we, moreover, not all by now accept that there was no independent legal entity in classical Athens similar to our modern concept of ‘state’ against which the individual citizen should be protected by the conferral of certain unalienable rights? Are we not too much arguing from our own liberal (or Marxist) ideas of state and citizenship, finding a reassuringly familiar definition in Aristotle’s philosophical

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work? In fact, the concept of rights was completely alien to the Greek *poleis*. Instead, Aristotle and many before him refer to ‘sharing in’ and ‘participating in’ (μετέχειν) or ‘being in a position to’ (ἐξεῖναι) when describing the status of citizenship, a status which one did not possess but embodied. Furthermore, the *polis* was not an entity separate from its citizens. It was above all a social organisation consisting of the *politai*, who, based on their Athenian descent and acceptance by the community, formed a collective of free Athenians, who equally shared in the corporate entity that was the *polis* according to the expectations of the group. A corporate identity, moreover, that should be studied with an eye for the intertwine-
ment of the political not only with the military and the juridical but also with the economical, the social and the religious. In fact, the application of such a separation of spheres to pre-modern societies in general is now seen as wholly anachronistic and to study the *polis* only from a political perspective therefore leads to an anachronistic and at best partial understanding. According to Manville, we should accordingly rid ourselves of our modern obsession with legal definitions and politics and return to the broader context of politics in the Greek sense of the word as ‘the world of the *polis*’.

Significantly, the difference between the ‘old’ abstract, political paradigm and the more organic or integrated one proposed by Manville and others is mirrored in the discrepancy between Aristotle’s definition of citizenship and the realities of the (Athenian) *polis*. No one would argue that similar to metics and children, as Aristotle states, ‘the old men who have been discharged [i.e. of military service] must be pronounced to be citizens in a sense, yet not quite absolutely’ (*Pol.* 1275a). Athenian old men were generally not perceived or described as an inferior category of semi-citizens. It would even be quite inappropriate not to include these often highly respected members among the *politai*. What is more, there is plenty of evidence indicating that Athenian women were considered *politai*, even though they were commonly excluded from participating in *krisis* and *arche*. True, old men no longer fought on the battlefield and women did not deliberate in the *ekklesia*, but, as Martin Ostwald argues, the *polis* had different expectations of each member and these old men and women were citizens in their own ways. These discrepancies can be explained when we consider that Aristotle was interested in a functional definition of Greek citizenship that he could use for a political interpre-

8 Ostwald (1996).
10 On the participation of old men in Athenian polis religion see infra 58–9.
tation of his ideal *polis*. The gap between his theoretical interpretation and the notions of his contemporaries in fact returns in Aristotle’s twofold use of the term ‘*polis*’, as Josh Ober observed. For Aristotle seems to have used ‘*polis*’ not only to denote a community of political animals\textsuperscript{13} but also to describe the social community living on its territory, which included many people who Aristotle did not strictly consider to be citizens.\textsuperscript{14} This signals a tension between Aristotle’s theoretical ideas and the realities of his time.

**SHARING IN THE *POLIS***

But what, then, were the realities of Aristotle’s time, or rather of the Athenian *polis* in the classical period, for which we have by far most evidence? Many court cases involving someone’s claims to citizenship demonstrate that the Athenians considered their *polis* to be a participatory community in which membership 1) was based on (the public acceptance of) Athenian descent – originally from one Athenian parent and after Pericles’ citizenship laws of 451/0 from two – and 2) consisted of sharing not only in *krisis* and *arche* but in the *polis* at large (μετέχειν τῆς πόλεως). For instance, Demosthenes could remind the Athenian jurors that they were the ones who had granted Athenian citizenship to a certain Charidemos ‘and by that gift bestowed him a share in our *hiera*, our *hosia*, our laws, and everything else in which we ourselves participate’ (καὶ ἱερῶν καὶ ὅσιων καί νομίμων καὶ πάντων ὅσων περ αὐτοῖς μέτεστιν ἡμῖν – 23.65). Similarly, in his *Speech against Neaera*, Apollodorus expresses his indignation about Stephanus, whose wife, the *hetaera* Neaera, and daughter Phano had both been participating in several ancestral Athenian rites that were open only to Athenian *politai*, with the following words:

> καίτοι πῶς οὐκ οἴεσθε δεινὸν εἶναι, εἰ τοὺς μὲν φύσει πολίτας καὶ γνησίως μετέχοντας τῆς πόλεως ἀπεστέρηκε τῆς παρρησίας Στέφανος οὑτοσί, τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν προσήκοντας βιάζεται Ἀθηναίους εἶναι παρὰ πάντας τοὺς νόμους;

Do you not consider it a monstrous thing, that this Stephanus has taken the right of free speech from those who are legitimate citizens by birth, who share in the *polis*, and in defiance of all the laws forces upon you as Athenians those who have no such right? ([Dem.] 59.28)

To contrast the monstrosity in the act that Neaera and Phano had shared in some of the most sacred rites of the Athenians despite their non-citizen status, Apollodorus “quotes” an Athenian decree by which a group of Plataean refugees had been

\textsuperscript{13} ‘Man is a political animal’ is a phrase seen as quintessentially Aristotelean but it is in fact a mistranslation of Ὁ ἄνθρωπος φύσει πολιτικὸν ζῷον (Arist. *Pol*. 1253a), literally ‘man is by nature a creature of the *polis*’.

granted citizenship in 427 after their city had been sacked by the Spartans and Thebans. According to the orator this grant included the statement that

Πλαταιέας εἶναι Ἀθηναίους ἀπὸ τῆς τῆς ἡμέρας, ἑπτάμους καθότεροι οἱ ἄλλοι Ἀθηναίοι, καὶ μετείναι αὐτοῖς ὁπνευ Ἀθηναίοις μέτεστι πάντων, καὶ ἰερῶν καὶ ὁσίων

“the Plataeans shall be Athenians from this day onwards, and shall have the same honours/shares as the other Athenians, and shall share in everything in which the Athenians share, both in the hiera and the hosia”. ([Dem.] 59.104)\

At least in the fourth century, then, Athenian citizenship could be described in terms of sharing (μετέχοντας; μετεῖναι; μέτεστι) in the common activities and goods of the polis. What is of great significance here, as Josine Blok has probably pointed out most clearly, is the fact that this active participation in the polis is often specified as μετέχειν τῶν ἱερῶν καὶ τῶν ὁσίων, as sharing in the hiera and the hosia of the Athenians. The plural noun ἱερὰ can be translated as ‘the things belonging (or being offered) to the gods’, which meant both the things in their possession, like shrines and treasures, and the things humans customarily owed the gods that were consecrated in a gift-giving process, most importantly in the form of (animal) sacrifice. But other offerings like votive statues and more ephemeral gifts like processions, athletic competitions and choruses were also considered ἱερὰ. The plural noun ὁσια is less straightforward, though, as W.R. Connor has convincingly argued, in general the term seems to always possess positive connotations and roughly means ‘the things concerning a good order between gods and humans and among humans that is pleasing to the gods’. Ὅσια consequently encompasses both laws concerning human behaviour towards other humans and so-called “sacred” laws, governing human behaviour towards the gods.


16 The translation is my own.


18 E.g. Lys. 6.48, 30.15; Dem. 24.201, 26.2, 57.47, 51; Aeschin. 1.160.

19 That choruses were considered gifts to the gods and thus hieros can be inferred from two oracular responses cited by Demosthenes in his Speech against Meidias (21.52–53). Demosthenes also takes the opportunity to stress the impiety (ἀσέβειαν) of Meidias’ act of tampering with his chorus (21.51).


Following Blok, it can thus be stated that being an Athenian citizen meant that one was to share in the rites of the Athenian polis in a proper and often prescribed, ancestral way in order to secure divine support for the community. By that same token, being an outsider to the Athenian community or becoming one because of unacceptable behaviour resulted in the exclusion from the rites of the Athenians. Foreigners (xenoi) were automatically excluded – although they could be present as spectators. In Apollodorus it is claimed that Athenian women will be angry at the jury if they acquit the foreign Neaera, ‘having it deemed right that this woman should share in like manner with themselves in the public ceremonial and religious rites’ ([Dem.] 59.11). In Demosthenes’ Speech against Euboulides, delivered shortly after the general revision of deme registers in 346/5, Euxitheus claims to be on the side of the defendant, the demarch Euboulides, for having rid the deme registers of foreigners who had passed as citizens (though he naturally does not agree with being struck of the records himself):

ἐγὼ γὰρ οἴομαι δεῖν ὑμᾶς τοῖς μὲν ἐξελεγχομένοις ξένοις οὖσιν χαλεπαίνειν, εἰ μὴτε πείσαντες μὴτε δεηθέντες ύμων λάθρᾳ καὶ βίᾳ τῶν ὑμετέρων ιερῶν καὶ κοινῶν μετείχον, τοῖς δ’ ἐπετηράσθαι καὶ διευνούσαι πολίτας ὡς ἑαυτούς βοηθεῖν καὶ σῶσειν

I am of the opinion you should be angry with proven xenoi if they, without consent or without asking for it, have shared in our hiera and koina, with slyness and force and bring help and deliverance to those who have met with misfortune and can prove that they are citizens. (57.3)

But not only xenoi were excluded from sharing in the hiera of the Athenian polis. In perfect opposition to grants of Athenian citizenship including the clause that new citizens would share in the hiera and hosia of the Athenians, Athenian citizens who had betrayed their citizen status because of inappropriate behaviour (atimoi) were excluded from the common rites. So, in the Speech against Neaera it is stated that adulterers were excluded from the hiera of the Athenians ([Dem.] 59.86). In On the Mysteries, Andocides refers to the law of Isotimides that aimed ‘to exclude from the hiera all who had committed an act of impiety’ (1.71). It should come as no sur-


23 In this speech, Andocides refers to another instance of unacceptable behaviour leading to the exclusion from one of the most important religious sites of Attica: ‘Should Cephisius here […] fail to gain one-fifth of the votes and so be subject to atimia, he is forbidden to enter the temple of the Two Goddesses [i.e. in Eleusis] under pain of death’ (1.33). Cf. Lycurg. 1.5. On atimia as a claim for a public discussion of someone’s social status: P.E. van ’t Wout, ‘Harbouring