INTRODUCTION

Ed Sanders

EMOTIVE TECHNIQUES AND PERSUASIVE GENRES

Emotion arousal played an integral role in Greek persuasion at least as far back as the Homeric epics, the earliest surviving Greek literary texts. At the start of the Iliad, the priest Chryses seeks to persuade Agamemnon to give up his enslaved daughter Chryseïs. He prays for Agamemnon’s and his army’s military success and safe return home, before offering a boundless ransom in exchange. We might expect this wish and exchange offer to arouse emotions: goodwill or possibly friendship, gratitude, perhaps desire for the goods. Homer does not mention these, but does say that while the other Achaians are won over to Chryses’ side – shouting their approval (ἐπευφήμησαν, 1.22) – Agamemnon is not pleased (οὐκ ... ἰνδάνε, 1.24) and refuses. Agamemnon utters a harsh threat against the priest, which in turn arouses his fear (ἐδεισοῦν, 1.33) and persuades him to do as commanded, i.e. leave. Chryses then calls on the god Apollo for support: he addresses him by a variety of flattering epithets, lists all the things he has done for Apollo, and asks that the god avenge his tears. Whether or not the flattery and reminders arouse Apollo’s goodwill or gratitude (not stated), they certainly arouse his anger on Chryses’ behalf (χοωομένος κῆρ, 1.44; χωομένοιο, 1.46), and he punishes the Achaian army in revenge.¹

Emotive argumentation had, therefore, long been part of persuasive strategies. However, our interest for this volume begins with the conscious reflection on and practice of emotive techniques of persuasion: i.e. the art, skill or science (technê) of rhetoric, and oratory that knowingly incorporates such techniques. These were well established by the time Aristotle complained waspishly, in the introduction to his treatise The art of rhetoric (usually called simply Rhetoric),² about rhetoricians’ tendency to over-focus on emotional arousal. Aristotle says that ‘Slander, pity, anger and such emotions of the soul have nothing to do with the facts, but are merely an appeal to the juror’ (Rh. 1.1, 1354a16–18: διαβολὴ γὰρ καὶ ἔλεος καὶ ὀργὴ καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν δικαστήν), and again that ‘one should not lead the juror into anger, envy or pity – it is like warping a carpenter’s rule’ (Rh. 1.1, 1354a24–6: οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὸν δικαστήν διαστρέφειν εἰς ὀργὴν προάγοντας ἢ φθόνον ἢ ἔλεον· ὅμοιον γὰρ κἂν εἰ

¹ Arist. Rh. 2.2, 1378a30–2 tells us that anger involves a desire for revenge. Rubinstein (2004) shows how often calls for punishment or retribution (kolazein/timôreisthai) are coupled with calls for anger (orgê) in Attic courtroom oratory.
² Written probably in the third quarter of the fourth century BCE – see Kennedy (2007) 6.
τις ὁ μέλλει χρῆσθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν), and he complains that those who write treatises on rhetoric treat of little else (Rh. 1.1, 1354a11–16).

Such rhetorical theorists were included among, or were direct intellectual descendants of, the sophists – itinerant teachers who wandered Greece from the mid-fifth century BCE taking on paying pupils, mainly the sons of the leisureed classes. Many of the most famous sophists gravitated to Athens which, thanks to the revenues of its empire, had a large wealthy/leisure class in this period, who wanted their sons trained (inter alia) to address the Assembly. Sophists had a variety of interests, but rhetoric was frequently one of the subjects on their curricula. This interest is foregrounded in the most famous depiction of sophists in literature, in Aristophanes’ comedy Clouds (dated 423 BCE), in which Socrates is lampooned as representative of the sophistic agenda: corrupting the young, not believing in the traditional gods, introducing new divinities, and teaching his pupils to wield morally wrong arguments so well as to overcome morally right ones.

One of the most important sophists – and most influential rhetoricians – was Gorgias. He features as one of Socrates’ interlocutors in Plato’s Gorgias, but in this dialogue his description of oratorical technique concentrates on the persuasive exposition of an argument, not arousing emotions. Socrates, in contrast, stresses the affective aspect when he says that oratory consists of the knack of producing gratification and pleasure in the audience through flattery (Pl. Grg. 462c3–7: ἐμπειρίαν ἔγωγέ τινα … χάριτος τινος καὶ ἡδονῆς ἀπεργασίας; 463a8–9: καλῶ δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγὼ τὸ κεφάλαιον κολακείαν). Gorgias’s own Encomium of Helen, however, certainly recognizes the importance of emotional persuasion, advising that:

Speech is a powerful lord that … can banish fear and remove grief and instill pleasure and enhance pity. (8) … The power of speech has the same effect on the condition of the soul as the application of drugs to the state of bodies; for just as different drugs dispel different fluids from the body, and some bring an end to disease but others end life, so also some speeches cause pain, some pleasure, some fear; some instill courage, some drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil persuasion. (14)

It is perhaps this sort of approach that Aristotle complains about.

By the late 420s, oratorical appeals to emotion were common enough to be satirized at length in Aristophanes’ comedy Wasps (dated 422). Early in the play we get a report that Kleon – a demagogue, described by the hostile historiographer Thucydides as ‘very violent’ (βιαιότατος, 3.36.6.4) – has enjoined jurors to turn

4 On the sophists in Athens, see Wallace (1998).
5 The real life Socrates was in fact executed on just these charges, according to Plato (Ap. 24b). See Hansen (1995) from the Athenian point of view.
6 See Dover (1968) xxxii–lvi on the association of these charges with the sophist movement, and Aristophanes’ choice of Socrates to represent them. In the play Unjust Argument (Adikos Logos), as his name implies, wins through mastery of eristic reasoning rather than emotional techniques.
up with three days’ worth of grievous anger, in order to punish offenders (Ar. *Vesp.* 243–4: ὁργὴν ... πονηρὰν ... ὡς κολωμένους ὧν ἠδίκησεν). The enthusiastic juror Philokleon later describes how defendants ask for pity (οίκτιρόν μ’, 556), then try everything they can to get off a charge: they bewail (ὑποκλάονται) their poverty and attribute their misfortunes to it; they quote myths, fables and jokes to make him laugh; they drag their children out front to bleat (βληχᾶται) in concert, while the defendant himself trembles (τρέμουν) and entreats him as a god to approve his accounts, asking him to have pity on hearing his son, or be persuaded by his daughter – this, he says, makes him relax his anger a little (562–74).

And in the mock trial later in the play, Bdelykleon entreats Philokleon to have pity on (οἰκτίρατ’) the dog Labes, and brings in Labes’ puppies, whom he instructs to beg and entreat while whimpering (κνυζομένα) and crying (δακρύετε) (975–8).

While this could be dismissed as comic fantasy, the fact that it could be staged in front of an Athenian audience suggests it is unlikely they would find such behaviour unrecognizable. Firmer evidence comes from [Lys.]. 20 (For Polystratos), a lawcourt speech delivered not many years after this, in which the speaker says: ‘Nevertheless, gentlemen of the jury, we see that if somebody brings forward his children and weeps and laments (κλαίῃ καὶ ὀλοφύρηται), you take pity (ἐλεοῦντας) on the children … and pardon the father’s crimes on account of the children’ (20.34); he then begs: ‘we [not having children to bring forward, but an aged father] bring forward our father and ourselves, and beg (ἐξαιτούμεθα) … pity (ἐλεήσατε) on our father, who is an old man (γέροντα ὄντα), and on us’ (20.35). The language and the behaviour are almost identical to that described in *Wasps*.

Other theatrical techniques were also available to orators. In Aristophanes’ comedy *Acharnians*, Dikaiopolis seeks leave to dress up for his trial, so as to look totally wretched (Ar. *Ach.* 383–4: ἐάσατε ἐνσκευάσασθαί μ’ οἷον ἀθλιώτατον). In both this play (711) and very frequently in Aristophanes’ *Knights* (274, 276, 285–7, 304, 311, 626, 1380), speakers use shouting, shrieking or a thunderous voice to terrify audiences. Perhaps the most striking example of this in a real speech comes not from Classical Athens, but from an Assembly speech given in the Sicilian city of Enguion in the late third century BCE. The speaker Nikias fakes possession by supernatural beings in order to freeze other citizens in fear long enough for him to flee the city safely (Plut. *Marc.* 20.5–6). Other emotions can be aroused in this

8 Todd (2000) 217 dates the speech to ‘probably 410 or possibly 409’.
10 On emotional arguments paralleled in oratory and (satirized in) Old Comedy, see Carey (this volume).
way too: e.g. Aristotle describes how voice and other delivery techniques such as gesture, dress and dramatic actions can engender pity (Rh. 2.8, 1386a32–b5).\footnote{On aspects of performance in Greek and Roman oratory, see Kremmydas, Powell and Rubinstein (2013). Hagen (this volume) explores the emotionally persuasive use of tears in Roman oratory and historiography.}

Despite his quibbles about the extent and manner in which other rhetoricians advised orators to manipulate emotions, Aristotle was perfectly happy for emotions to be aroused through proofs (pisteis).\footnote{Dow (2007) is persuasive on resolving the ‘contradiction’ between Rh. 1.1’s criticism of emotional techniques and Rh. 1.2’s advocacy of emotional proofs; cf. Dow’s bibliography for further scholarship on this issue.} He argues: ‘Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character [êthos] of the speaker; the second on putting the listeners into a certain frame of mind [ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατήν διαθεῖναί πνεύμα]; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the argument [logos] of the speech itself’ (Rh. 1.2, 1356a1–4), then confirms re the second that ‘persuasion may come through the listeners, when the speech stirs the emotions [pathos]’ (Rh. 1.2, 1356a14–15: διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν).\footnote{Trans. Rhys Roberts (1984) 2155, slightly modified.}

Having spent some time talking of other issues, he returns to emotions in a lengthy section of the treatise (Rh. 2.1–11), which he introduces as follows:

The emotions are all those feelings that so change men as to affect their judgements, and that are also attended by pain or pleasure. Such are anger, pity, fear and the like, with their opposites. We [i.e. Aristotle] must arrange what we have to say about each of them under three heads. Take, for instance, the emotion of anger: here we must discover what the state of mind of angry people is, who the people are with whom they usually get angry, and on what grounds they get angry with them.… The same is true of the other emotions.\footnote{Rh. 2.1, 1378a19–26, trans. Rhys Roberts (1984) 2195. See Leighton (1996) on the ways in which emotion can contribute to alteration of judgment. Frede (1996) discusses how emotions are ‘attended’ by pain and pleasure.}

The following chapters are devoted to discussions of one emotion or a pair of ‘opposite’ (enantion) emotions: 2.2 and 2.3 respectively on anger (orgê) and calming down (praünsis); 2.4 on friendship (philia) and hatred (mïsos); 2.5 on fear (phobos) and confidence (tharsos); 2.6 on shame (aischunê) and shamelessness (anaïschuntia); 2.7 on gratitude (charin echein) and briefly ingratitude (acharistein);\footnote{Agreeing with Konstan (2006) 156–68 that these are the emotions discussed, rather than kindness (charis) and unkindness as favoured by most previous scholars, e.g. Grimaldi (1988) 128; Cope (1877) II.89 agrees with gratitude.} 2.8 on pity (eleos); 2.9 on indignation (nemesis); 2.10 on envy (phthonos); and 2.11 on emulation (zêlos) and scorn (kataphrontêsis).\footnote{He describes a number of unnamed emotions too.}

\footnote{On this group, see Sanders (2014) 59–64.}
which emotions may be appropriate for different sorts of speech,\(^{19}\) or which will work well together. A second surviving rhetorical treatise from the Classical period, probably by Anaximenes,\(^ {20}\) also discusses emotion arguments – primarily in the chapters on deliberative and judicial oratory (respectively chs 34 and 36), in which he describes three friendly emotions (pity, goodwill and gratitude) and three hostile ones (anger, hatred and envy) as particularly important.\(^ {21}\)

The second set of ancient source material of particular relevance to this volume is oratory, beginning with the group of speeches written and (mostly) performed in Athens in the period c. 420–322 BCE, known as the ‘Attic oratorical corpus’. This corpus contains approximately 105 judicial speeches (both prosecution and defence speeches, on matters of both public and private law, as well as adjudications),\(^ {22}\) sixteen deliberative speeches (delivered to the Athenian Assembly), and a handful of display speeches (mostly funeral speeches, delivered by a leading politician to honour the war dead), as well as some letters,\(^ {23}\) political tracts and rhetorical exercises. Unlike the rhetorical treatises – the extent of whose relation to practical oratory is debatable – this corpus tells us how persuasion was actually ‘done’ in this very fruitful literary period: these speeches, letters and tracts demonstrably use emotional techniques as part of their persuasion strategies.\(^ {24}\) Such techniques are both overt, with emotions explicitly called for, and covert, with emotions aroused indirectly by the judicious use of words and phrases that act as psychological triggers.\(^ {25}\)

Both these types of evidence – theoretical (rhetoric) and practical (oratory) – have their counterparts in later antiquity too. Survivals from the Hellenistic eastern Mediterranean are limited,\(^ {26}\) but a large number of speeches survive from the Imperial period, mostly given in a civic context (e.g. the speeches of Dio of Prusa). More relevant to this volume are rhetorical treatises and speeches from the Roman Late Republic and Principate. The Ciceronian corpus is vast,\(^ {27}\) and contains many speeches utilizing emotional techniques.\(^ {28}\) Of interest too are his

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19 Judicial, deliberative and display being the three subdivisions he discusses at *Rh.* 1.3 – other types such as hortatory, supplicatory etc. presumably being hybrids.

20 This treatise, the *Rhetoric to Alexander*, is contained within the Aristotelian corpus. Its attribution to Anaximenes of Lampasacus is longstanding and probably correct.

21 See further Sanders (this volume).

22 Griffith-Williams (this volume) considers two adjudications in inheritance disputes.

23 For emotive persuasion in literary letters, see Westwood (this volume).

24 For a brief introduction to emotion in Classical Greek rhetoric and oratory, see Konstan (2010).

25 On explicit versus covert emotion arousal, see further Sanders (2012a) 160–1 and (2014) 88–98.

26 Though on this period see particularly Kremmydas and Tempest (2013).

27 There are only two non-Ciceronian complete speeches in Latin pre-200 CE: a panegyric by Pliny praising Trajan, and a (self-)defence speech by Apuleius on a charge of seduction by magic – see Powell (2011).

28 Cicero’s use of emotional techniques has tended to be taken for granted in scholarly studies. The use of emotion has been highlighted especially in the closing sections of his defence speeches, where an appeal to pity (*commiseratio*) is a standard ingredient; cf. Winterbottom (2004). Gildenhard (2010) 36 notes Cicero’s at first sight surprising tendency to pre-
rhetorical works, in particular (for our purposes) *De oratore*, which contains a large section discussing emotional techniques (2.178–216), partly a recapitulation of Greek rhetorical ideas, but particularly adding deeper discussions of voice, gesture and dress.  

A second important Roman rhetorician is Quintilian, who also discusses emotional techniques at length (*Institutio* 6.1.7–2.36).

A third type of evidence of great importance to this volume is literary representations of speeches. These primarily occur in historiography. Ever since Herodotus, it was a recognized part of ancient historiography to include speeches – especially deliberative and hortatory speeches (those used to effect political-strategic decisions, and to encourage armies before battle) – that contributed to the unfolding of the events portrayed. They are more or less prominent in different historiographers, but they appear to be universally used, and are frequently reported in direct speech (*oratio recta*) – though sometimes in indirect (*oratio obliqua*).  

Historiographers were not merely recording facts, but creating works of literature, and accordingly they had a choice both of which speeches (out of the vast number actually given) to include, and how accurately or not they wished to portray those speeches. Literary representations of persuasion are not confined to historiography: speeches appear in a wide variety of other genres, and other forms of verbal interlocution can also be persuasive.

One other type of persuasive literature should be discussed, and that is the technical or didactic treatise, which seeks to persuade the reader. Treatises survive from at least as early as the Classical period (fifth to fourth centuries BCE), and become increasingly common in the latter part of that period and into the Hel-

sent himself as in the grip of strong emotion. On emotion in Ciceronian oratory, see also Webb (1997); Powell (2007); Craig (2010).

29 For a brief introduction to emotion in Roman rhetoric and oratory, see Hall (2007).

30 See in particular Sanders, Fragoulaki, Winter, Knight and Hagen (this volume).

31 The inclusion of speeches in *oratio recta* and *obliqua* as a narratological technique significantly predates the historiographic genre, going back at least as far as Homer – see Fox and Livingstone (2010) 544–6.

32 E.g. Finley (1972) 26–7, in turn quoting Dion. Hal. *Thuc.*: ‘Why this particular Funeral Oration, he asked? The occasion was neither glorious nor significant. The answer, he suggested, is that Thucydides wanted a Funeral Oration by Pericles at any price. Or why, he asked, are we given the long debate on the reconsideration of the decision to put all Mytilenian males to death, when we properly ought to have had the original debate?’

33 Thucydides is famously ambiguous about the accuracy of the speeches he records, saying: ‘I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words [...] that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for [...] by each situation’; trans. Warner (1972) 47.

34 For example, see Johncock (this volume) on speeches in Ovid’s epic poem *Metamorphoses*.

35 Iurescia (this volume) discusses quarrels in Roman comedy, manufactured by one character for the purposes of persuading another.
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lenistic (third to first centuries BCE) and Roman.\(^36\) They cover a very wide range of topics, from medical through military to mathematical or economic. The Hippocratic and Galenic corpora are examples of the first. Xenophon was also a prolific author, whose surviving works include several treatises.\(^37\) Treatise writers might attempt to arouse a reader’s emotions, as part of their persuasive technique. Other genres too can arouse a reader’s emotions, most particularly poetry.\(^38\)

Finally, we should be aware of the very many types of persuasion that are not literary. These include personal letters (preserved on papyri) and petitions (on papyri or carved in stone). They also include prayers or curses addressed to gods (also on papyri or inscribed), left at religious sanctuaries or in graves, or thrown down wells. They also include civic inscriptions, intended to persuade a variety of readers. While some of these types of source material might be written by men (or women) with some degree of learning, many more were written by those with little learning, and were not crafted using literary techniques of persuasion – albeit that they might have generic conventions of their own.\(^39\)

THE SCOPE AND CONTENT OF THIS VOLUME

This volume addresses the variety of ways in which emotions form part of strategies of persuasion, both within societies and between groups and individuals in the ancient world. It considers different strata of society (civic equals, armies and their commanders, emperors and their subjects, gods and humans), and diverse media of communication. Persuasion may be effected by narrative, exhortation (explicit or covert), or physical actions. Emotional strategies can be aimed at superiors, inferiors or one’s equals; to strangers or friends; and deployed for personal gain or the public good. As we have seen, they can appear in oral communications (judicial, deliberative, display, hortatory, supplicatory etc.) designed to be heard once, their representations in literature, or in written communications that can be read again and again (e.g. treatises, other literary works, letters, inscriptions).

No single volume could cover the usage of emotion in persuasive strategies in the entirety of ancient written literary and non-literary media, and this book does not attempt to take such a ‘handbook’ approach. Rather (and reflecting its origin as a selection of the best papers from a recent conference),\(^40\) the volume presents exciting new thinking in areas of this subject that are currently commanding research (and growing public) interest.

In recent years scholarship on emotive persuasion techniques has focused primarily on two areas: rhetorical techniques as propounded by technical treatises

\(^{37}\) See e.g. Winter (this volume).
\(^{38}\) See Johncock and Hammond (this volume) for examples.
\(^{39}\) See Chaniotis, Dickey and Salvo (this volume).
\(^{40}\) Held by the Centre for Oratory and Rhetoric (COR) at Royal Holloway, University of London, on 27–28 June 2013.
(Aristotle, Anaximenes, Cicero, Quintilian); explicit exhortation to feel a small group of emotions (anger, hatred, envy, gratitude, pity, goodwill) in Attic forensic oratory. This volume is consciously designed to move beyond these two areas of scholarship, to examine the use of emotion in rhetorical practice in a wide variety of literary genres, non-literary (inscriptional and papyrological) texts, and even physical movement. And it does so, in some cases, by employing a range of theoretical methods (such as conversational analysis, speech act theory and pragmatics) that have proved effective in other areas of classical scholarship, or in emotion studies in other disciplines (e.g. linguistics, sociology, psychology).

Part I recognizes that our first significant evidence for the Greek understanding of, theorizing about and use of emotion as a rhetorical technique comes from the specific historical society of Classical Athens. This is both because of the unusually wide participation in oratorical practice thanks to the radical democracy, and due to the establishment of philosophical schools in that city during that particular period. Accordingly the first section of the book is devoted to that one society. However, it looks at types of speeches never before examined in connection with emotions, and draws connections to other contemporary genres. Carey’s chapter explores arguments, in both forensic and deliberative oratory and with supporting evidence in historiography and Old Comedy, that play to hostility towards a politically dominant individual or faction as part of the competition for power. Griffith-Williams considers the choice of using, or not using, emotional arguments alongside rational ones in speeches in inheritance cases, a specific class of forensic speech so far largely ignored in studies of emotion. Sanders turns to deliberative speeches, arguing that a completely different set of emotions (fear, confidence, hope, shame and pride) is pertinent to this branch of oratory than those used in forensic speeches, evidenced by both the Attic corpus and representations of speeches in Thucydidean historiography. Westwood considers Demosthenes’ Letters, written in his exile to the Athenian Assembly and Council, showing that in their emotional strategies – narrative of nostalgia to arouse pity


43 See Jackson (this volume) on the last of these.

44 On which see respectively Hammond, Iurescia and Dickey (this volume). Eckert (this volume) uses sociological theories of ‘trauma’.
and goodwill, and arousal of nostalgia in the reader/listener – they function very like actual speeches.

While Part I necessarily concentrates on (Classical) Greece, the attention of the remainder of the book is divided almost equally – though not symmetrically – between Greece (of all periods) and Rome. The following three Parts focus on three different directions in which study has spiralled out from Attic oratory. While it will become apparent that there is a range of interconnections between chapters in different sections, the organization that has been chosen highlights three particularly notable thematic groupings.

Part II examines a variety of ways in which emotion is used in the formation of community identity. Chaniotis considers how the authors of epigraphic texts from poleis across the Greek eastern Mediterranean sought to create a feeling of community through emotional arousal – a form of purportedly communal emotional performance. Fragoulaki returns to Thucydides, and considers two dramatic rhetorical occasions, in which emotional persuasion techniques are (or are consciously not) used internally between speaker and audience, and externally between Thucydides and his readers. Eckert’s is the first chapter to take us to Rome, with an interdisciplinary approach to the emotional response to cultural trauma (arising from Sulla’s proscriptions), and its rhetorical use in Ciceronian forensic oratory and a range of later genres that borrow from and extend Cicero’s techniques. Finally, Jackson’s chapter examines Plato’s description of how emotions could be incited, moulded and instilled in a community through participation in choral dance techniques, leading to their socialization and mass persuasion to behaviour appropriate to the polis.

Part III considers emotive persuasion strategies in situations of unequal power. Winter compares Xenophon’s Hipparchicus (Cavalry Commander), a technical treatise containing instruction in the manipulation of the emotions of one’s men, political superiors and the enemy, but no examples, with practical examples in the same author’s historiographical Anabasis. Knight examines narratives of ira Caesaris in poetry, philosophy and historiography, showing how Roman emperors could judiciously use displays of anger to persuade their subjects to submit to imperial control, and how this technique could be abused. Hagen’s chapter provides a counterfoil, moving from Cicero’s theoretical advice on the rhetorical use of tears – as a somatic indicator of a variety of emotions – to practical examples in Roman historiography of emperors using tears as an emotive tool to persuade and control their subjects. Johncock takes us from the human to the divine, examining speeches in Ovid’s Metamorphoses in which frequently a human tries, but fails, to persuade a god; however, Ovid succeeds in persuading his reader of the speaker’s case, and inspiring him or her to pity.

Part IV has two foci, contributing to a greater or lesser extent to each chapter: linguistic formulae used to generate emotion, and genre-specific emotive persuasion. Dickey uses pragmatic theories of politeness to examine a shift from making requests via bald imperatives (Classical period) to the emergence of a language of politeness (Hellenistic period, both literary and papyrological texts), which reflects changes in language suggesting heightened emotion. Salvo exa-
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mines how curses and magic spells (inscriptions and papyri) addressed to gods aimed to arouse the god’s emotions to persuade him/her to make a mortal fall in love with the writer; the god’s methods of doing this effectively comprise a secondary persuasion strategy that also might include emotion arousal – though different emotions to those aroused in the god. **Iurescia** takes a multi-disciplinary theoretical approach to quarrels in Roman comedy, exploring linguistic techniques through which negative emotions (anger and fear) can be aroused to throw a collocutor’s judgment off-balance and manipulate them. Finally, **Hammond** uses discursive psychology to examine Catullus’s emotional discourse – his choice of language and invention of linguistic terms – which both expresses the emotions of characters in his poems, and arouses the reader’s emotions to persuade them of the verisimilitude of the depicted conversations.

As well as the connections between chapters in the same Part, a wide range of further thematic links will become apparent (and the reader’s attention will be directed to these by the frequent cross-references between chapters). It is worthwhile here drawing attention to some of these thematic interconnections. While most of the chapters deal with *arousing* emotions in order to persuade, some (Chaniotis, Fragoulaki, Knight, Hagen, Dickey) instead/also deal with *displaying* or *performing* emotions – truly felt or otherwise – to persuade. Griffith-Williams and Fragoulaki both compare in depth two attempts at persuasion, one of which is made using emotional arguments, the other (at least at the surface level) avoiding them. Several chapters (Chaniotis, Hagen, Salvo, Johncock) focus on or refer to persuasion of gods. And several (Fragoulaki, Salvo, Johncock) involve persuasion of the reader.

We hope our reader is persuaded – emotionally or not – of the value of this collection.

**BIBLIOGRAPHY**


