INTRODUCTION

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The papers in this volume all derive from the conference, ‘Emotions in the Classical World: Methods, Approaches, and Directions’, held at the Fondation Hardt, Vandoeuvres, 2–4 May, 2013. The inclusion of Geneva’s Latinists in the Centre Interfacultaire en Sciences Affectives (part of the Swiss National Center of Competence in Research, Affective Sciences) and CISA’s generous funding for the conference and related research activities were the immediate catalysts; but the deeper reasons for planning the conference and this resulting volume lay in our sense that what had until fairly recently been sporadic and isolated contributions to the study of ancient emotions had begun to coalesce into a substantial and thriving sub-discipline in the fields of Classics and Ancient History, one in which Classicists and Ancient Historians now had significant contributions to make to the wider upsurge in interest in the emotions that has taken place across a range of disciplines in recent years. Given all that had been achieved in our fields, and how much remained to be done, we felt that it was time to take stock, consolidate, and look to the future.

Emotion research is now an enormous field, too vast to survey. Major centres have been established for interdisciplinary research in emotion and affective science. The upsurge of interest in emotion in Humanities disciplines is one aspect of these developments, and central to that phenomenon has been the impetus given to the historical study of emotions by scholars such as William Reddy and Barbara Rosenwein. In this area, too, major research projects and centres for emotion history have been established, in Australia, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and the field continues to expand. In that connection, the landmark

1 See http://www.affective-sciences.org.
2 The journal Emotion Review publishes regular ‘views from a discipline’ and is an excellent repository of current approaches. For recent, stimulating, and accessible contributions (albeit with a philosophical bias), see e.g. Goldie 2010, Deonna and Teroni 2012, and Colombetti 2014. For an encyclopaedic and interdisciplinary overview of research in emotion and affective science, see Sander and Scherer 2009.
3 See n. 1 above, and cf. Languages of Emotion at the Free University of Berlin (http://www.loe.fu-berlin.de/en/).
5 See the websites for the Australian Research Council Centre of Excellence for the History of Emotion (http://www.historyofemotions.org.au), Les émotions au Moyen Âge (EMMA,
development in Classics has been Angelos Chaniotis’ University of Oxford project, funded by the European Research Council, entitled ‘The Social and Cultural Construction of Emotions: The Greek Paradigm’. This has so far yielded two substantial volumes of essays (with more forthcoming) and has considerably broadened the evidence base and the focus of emotion research in Classics.\(^7\)

A truth established by emotion research across the disciplines in which it is practised is the ubiquity, pervasiveness, and centrality of emotion in everything that human beings do and everything that they have ever done. This is one reason why it cannot by any means be said that Classics research had, before the recent upsurge in interest, ignored emotion. Inevitably, this was a topic that featured prominently wherever it was regarded as particularly important for our understanding of the works, contexts, and genres in which it occurred – in ancient philosophy, for example, where the views of ancient thinkers and schools on the role of emotion in the good life have always been central subjects of scholarship; in the study of ancient poetics, aesthetics, and rhetoric; in scholarship on epic and tragedy; and so on.

At the same time, however, the development of a dialogue in which research in Classics and Ancient History slowly began to take account of contemporary research in other fields can be traced to the later years of the twentieth century. A pioneering work here is William Fortenbaugh’s 1975 book on Aristotle, which is fully informed by the cognitive-evaluative approach to emotion which achieved prominence in the 1950s and 1960s.\(^8\) A measure of the advance that this work represented over traditional approaches may be taken by means of a comparison with W. B. Stanford’s *Greek Tragedy and the Emotions*, published eight years later.\(^9\) Useful enough in many of its individual observations, Stanford’s work nonetheless falls short in its reliance on traditional philological connoisseurship and the absence of theoretical underpinning.

The approach outlined in Fortenbaugh’s book was a crucial stimulus to Cairns’s 1993 volume on *aidōs*, which sought to synthesize the perspectives on


\[^7\] See http://emotions.classics.ox.ac.uk, with Chaniotis 2012d; Chaniotis and Ducrey 2013.

\[^8\] Fortenbaugh 1975; a second edition appeared in 2002. Landmarks in the development of the cognitive-evaluative approach include (as well as the philosophical contributions cited by Fortenbaugh himself) the appraisal theories of Magda Arnold (Arnold 1960) and Richard Lazarus (summed up in e.g. Lazarus 1991) and the experiments of Schachter and Singer (Schachter and Singer 1962) which purported to demonstrate that it is was not arousal of the autonomic nervous system but situational appraisal that specified an episode as emotional and differentiated one emotion from another.

\[^9\] Stanford 1983.
honour and shame offered by Classical thinkers such as the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle with the representation of *aidōs* and similar affective phenomena in imaginative literature, especially epic and tragedy. The cognitive-evaluative account of emotion was central also to the spate of monographs and edited collections on emotion and particular emotions that appeared in the 2000s, works whose central strength was their focus on the ancient emotional lexicon and the construction, conceptualisation, and valorisation of emotion in ancient authors, genres, philosophical schools, and societies.

A central figure in galvanizing, supporting, and generating much of this scholarship has been David Konstan, who (in several accounts of particular emotions and affective phenomena and in his major study of *The Emotions of the Ancient Greeks*) has contributed in particular to our understanding of ancient theories of emotion (particularly those of Aristotle and the Stoics, which offer particularly fruitful opportunities for dialogue with modern cognitive-evaluative approaches), to the semantics and history of ancient emotional concepts, and to the sharpening of our appreciation of salient differences between ancient emotional lexica and our own. It is salutary to remember that not even the concept of emotion itself is a transcultural historical constant, even if it is true that few or no cultures have ever been able entirely to dispense with a category of a similar sort. One of the central emphases of Konstan’s work (and of many of the other studies on ancient emotion produced since the 1990s) has been the interaction between emotion and moral and social norms. This is an interaction that needs to be viewed from both angles, not only in terms of the embeddedness of ancient emotions, emotion concepts, and theories of emotion in social interaction and cultural normativity, but also in terms of the fundamentally affective character of

12 For recent and valuable studies in the same vein, see e.g. Caston 2012; Fulkerson 2013; Sanders 2014.
15 Salient differences between English ‘emotion’ and Greek *pathos* emerge particularly in Fortenbaugh’s discussion in this volume.
16 On the historical contingency of the English-language concept of emotion, see Dixon 2003, 2012. Against the assumption that the English-language category of emotion (and its constituent taxonomies) are universal, but also in favour of the existence of at least broadly analogous categories in all languages, see Wierzbicka 1999.
ancient moral, social, and legal values. These are features that are emphasized in
some of the most important contributions within Classical Studies, but they also
constitute major topics in other disciplines.

Literature has loomed large in these discussions, especially because literary
sources provide rich evidence for the complex dynamics of emotional episodes in
multifaceted depictions of more or less realistic forms of social interaction. Gen-
res such as epic and drama provide various perspectives on characters’ motivation
and substantial information on the eliciting conditions of their emotions, all of
which can guide our interpretation both of explicit ascriptions of emotion and of
implicit representations of emotional behaviour. A wide range of other genres
(from elegiac poetry and historiography to forensic oratory and biography) rely
similarly on narrative constructions of characteristic affective scenarios as con-
texts for their representations of and appeals to emotion. In a very real sense, then,
the manifold forms of dramatic enactment and narrative representation of emotion
in literature reflect the paradigmatic scenarios of emotion in the wider culture or
in particular ‘emotional communities’ within that culture. If literary representa-
tions of agency are successful, then we have good evidence of affectivity in action
in the cultures we study – in the agents represented in literary artefacts, in their
interaction with other agents and with internal audiences, and in the appeal to the
emotions of external audiences. This is one reason why Classicists have been right
to make such extensive use of literary evidence in their contributions to the his-
torical study of emotion, and why literary sources still provide much of the evi-
dence and subject matter in this volume.

The emotional texture and affective character of literary works also figure
prominently in contemporary emotion research. But a further feature of this
strand of research is its focus on the emotional responses of readers and audienc-
es, the subject of Cairns’s and Halliwell’s chapters in this volume and a topic in
several of the others. Here, the concerns of modern emotional research and those
of ancient poetics, aesthetics, and rhetoric coalesce in seeing emotion as a salient
element in readers’ and audiences’ engagement with texts, performances, and nar-
ratives and in the techniques by which those texts, performances, and narratives

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17 See e.g. (on emotion, moral and social norms, and the emotional scripts of ordinary social
interaction) Harris 2001; Kaster 2005; Sanders 2014. On the affective character of ancient
Greek moral, social, and legal norms see also D. L. Cairns 1993, 2003a, 2003b, 2015. In this
volume, see esp. Graver on the norms, scripts, and display rules that conditioned Cicero’s
grief over the death of his daughter.

18 On the intimate relationship between emotions and social norms, see esp. Elster 1999. On the
emotional character of moral norms, see e.g. Prinz 2007; De Sousa 2008; Bagnoli 2011. On
emotions, values, and legal norms, see Deigh 2008 and the January 2016 issue of Emotion

19 To use the term introduced by Rosenwein 2006; see also Chaniotis 2011.

20 See nn. 11–12 above.

21 See esp. the chapters by Battistella and Nelis, Cairns, Damon, Fulkerson, Halliwell, Lateiner,
and Munteanu.

succeed in fostering that engagement. Not only do works of literature embed and embody the emotion scripts of their society and culture, they also constitute emotion scripts in themselves, feeding back into, recalibrating, and extending the emotional repertoires and capacities of their audiences. The emotion-eliciting power of texts is not just a matter of the depiction of emotion in the text. The mechanisms by which texts exert this power, however, as well as the nature of the responses that these mechanisms elicit, are matters of controversy; this is an area where the centuries’ worth of implicit and explicit testimony that classical literature and classical literary theory have to offer on the emotional power of texts and performances can still make a contribution to contemporary debate, not only in applying modern theory to ancient sources or in bringing our literary-theoretical approaches into contact with the cognitive and affective sciences, but also in using the richness of ancient theory to interrogate modern assumptions.

If literary texts draw on the paradigmatic emotion scenarios of the culture in which they are created, they also help create, disseminate, and extend those paradigms, not only in individual readers and audience members, for whom the emotional scripts embedded in a literary work may be exemplary or who may find their emotional repertoires stretched by engagement with literature, but also in the work of other artists and in whole genres. Other works of literature constitute a significant aspect of the contextual background against which the emotions portrayed in and elicited by particular texts must be read, as Battistella and Nelis remind us in this volume.

Historiography perhaps constitutes a special case in this general connection. On the one hand, the role of emotion in the genre became a subject of debate already in antiquity: historiography is permeated by the theories of emotion that prevailed in ancient aesthetics, ethics, and rhetoric, just as it is thoroughly influenced by the practices of other literary genres (especially tragedy), yet the purpose and use of emotion-eliciting scenarios in the genre could be the subject of polemic and controversy. At the same time, historiography needs to confront emotion as a factor in historical causation. And, as Damon notes, ancient historians did precisely that: as she points out ‘Thucydides’ “truest cause” for the Peloponnesian

23 See D. L. Cairns 2014, esp. 103–109; cf. Cairns, this volume (pp. 53–78), with references in n. 69; Munteau, this volume (pp. 79–103).
24 See Halliwell, this volume (pp. 105–123), and cf. Damon, pp. 183ff. on Thucydides 7.29–30.
25 As indeed is happening, within Classics, in the work of scholars such as Felix Budelmann (see e.g. Budelmann and Easterling 2010; Budelmann and LeVen 2014; Budelmann, Maguire, and Teasdale 2016), Jonas Grethlein (e.g. Grethlein 2015a, 2015b), Elizabeth Minchin (e.g. Minchin 2001), Ruth Scodel (e.g. Scodel 2014), and Ineke Sluiter (e.g. Duijn, Sluiter, and Verhagen 2015), with much more in the pipeline. So far, however, few have concentrated specifically on emotion.
26 See the chapters by Cairns and Halliwell in this volume, with further references (pp. 53–78 and 105–123).
27 See also Nelis 2015; and cf. (e.g.) F. Cairns 2005.
28 See Damon, this volume (pp. 178–194), with references to ancient sources and modern discussion.
war – Sparta’s fear, φόβος, of Athens’ growing power (1.23.6) – is the tip of a very large iceberg.”

The Greeks and Romans recognized the importance of emotions in history, if not of emotion history, in ways that are only now coming back into focus. At the same time, this is an enterprise that is fraught with difficulty. That we live in an infinite affective continuum is a point made not only by the likes of William James, but also (as emerges from a passage quoted in this volume by Stephen Halliwell) by the ancient author of On the Sublime (22.1): ‘there is an indefinite multiplicity of emotions (pathē) and no one can even say how many they are’. Every motive that every living human being has ever entertained has been affectively charged: affectivity is fundamental to consciousness, to cognition, and to the ways that we make sense of the natural and social environments. The experiences we pick out and label as emotions or emotional episodes are just the peaks and troughs in this continuous emotional landscape. But if this is true, the history of emotions will be a difficult thing to write. Certain emotions, in certain individuals, sectors of society, and communities, are inevitably privileged in terms of the causal force they are felt to have exerted. This tendency towards schematization can extend even to the point at which it becomes an aspect of periodization – the ‘age of anxiety’, and so on.

It is, however, undeniable that emotions are powerful historical forces. It is also undeniable that there is a history not only of such forces but also of their categorization and conceptualization. We can historicize emotions in terms of their importance as causes of particular historical events, the norms and values that regulate their expression in different places at different times, their role in the history of ideas and belief systems, and the ways in which the language, labelling, and valorization of emotion shifts over time and varies from culture to culture. In attempting to pursue this project, Classics has to date – for the good reasons outlined above – concentrated extensively on language and texts. This marks a substantial difference of emphasis between Classics (and certain other historically focused Humanities disciplines) and much mainstream emotion research in other disciplines. Although there is no single agreed definition of emotion or accepted account of what counts as emotion across the range of disciplines that deal with the issues and phenomena in question, it would be fair to say that the most favoured approach in many branches of the behavioural sciences is some form of

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29 Damon, this volume, pp. 178 and 181. See also the studies of Thucydidean historiography cited in her n. 19.
30 James 1890, ii.485.
31 πολλά γὰρ καὶ ἄναριθμα πάθη καὶ οὐδ᾽ ἂν εἰπεῖν τις ὁπόσα δύναιτο (quoted by Halliwell, below, p. 114).
32 See now Colombetti 2014.
33 Again, there is much to be learned here from the work of David Konstan, whether it concerns the shifts in meaning of Greek phthonos and nemesis (Konstan 2003), the changing valorization of pity, clemency, etc. (Konstan 2001), or the emergence of a modern concept of forgiveness in contradistinction to the scenarios envisaged by ancient Greek syngnōmē or Roman ignoscere (Konstan 2010).
appraisal theory, as represented in the work of figures such as Magda Arnold, Richard Lazarus and Nico Frijda. In the case of the ‘component process model’ developed by the Geneva school under Klaus Scherer this is a multidimensional and multifactorial approach that encompasses a range of cognitive and physiological processes. Models of this type can be adapted in the attempt to take account of cross-cultural and historical variation, but in general they are not much concerned with labels, categories, and the various things that language can do to emotion. Many rival and complementary approaches pay even less attention to such things: for Paul Griffiths, only ‘basic emotions’ or ‘affect programme responses’, i.e. short-term, spontaneous, and physical experiences, can be studied scientifically; conceptual analysis can elucidate a society’s beliefs about emotion, but cannot get us any closer to what emotions really are. Jesse Prinz’s ‘embodied appraisal’ model recognizes that emotion episodes are multi-componential events, yet seeks to isolate the one single component that is the emotion, finding it (like William James and Kurt Lange before him) in the perception of bodily change. For a large number of other researchers, the primary focus of investigation is the physical experience of the individual, whether in terms of facial expressions or neurophysiological changes. But the fundamental problem with this is that, as features of language, thought, and culture, the phenomena that we categorize as emotions and that other cultures have categorized in other, at least partly comparable terms, encompass much more than these approaches attempt to address.

The general approach to emotion that has become established in Classics, then, based on language and literary or philosophical texts, still has much to offer. But that approach has been and can be further transformed by the broadening of the field, its focus, and its source base. This is the particular merit of Angelos Chaniotis’ Oxford ERC-funded project, mentioned above. Its inaugural publication, Unveiling Emotions: Sources and Methods for the Study of Emotions in the Greek World, both outlines and fulfils a programme of expanding the source material for the study of ancient Greek emotion, from the traditional and virtually exclusive focus on literary and philosophical sources towards a wider range of non-literary and sub-literary documents and a much greater concentration on material culture.

In one respect, this represents a move away from elite and culturally authoritative literary texts to other forms of textual evidence – e.g. letters, wills, and peti-
tions; \(^{43}\) inscriptions set up by private individuals; \(^{44}\) and inscriptions, both religious and secular, commissioned by communities of various kinds. \(^{45}\) But the broadening of the source base also encompasses a shift of focus on to non-textual forms of evidence – to visual and material culture. Visual culture, in particular, is an area in which great opportunities exist, but also considerable obstacles. In principle, sources such as vase-painting and sculpture might be thought to afford direct access to the physical expression of emotion in gesture and body language. But, as Glenys Davies points out, ‘although some aspects of body language are universal and found across cultures many behaviours are culture-specific, and it should not be assumed that an interpretation that seems natural or obvious to us would have been so for the Roman [or Greek] viewer’. \(^{46}\) Contemporary scientific accounts can help, especially if they can offer strong grounds, with robust cross-cultural evidence, that a given expression or gesture genuinely is found in a range of cultures; but even so it would be unsafe merely to assimilate representations of emotion in the visual arts of the ancient Greeks and Romans to our own understanding (even if scientifically informed) of what appears to be depicted. To link the depiction of non-verbal behaviour in ancient art to ancient concepts of emotion we typically require warrant from linguistic (and especially narrative) sources, \(^{47}\) together with as much contextual information (e.g. about the identity and status of the individuals depicted, the relation between their depiction and ancient norms of self-presentation, proxemics, and emotional display, etc.) as can reasonably be obtained, as well as a thorough understanding of the iconography of the wider corpus to which the depiction belongs. Though progress is being made, \(^{48}\) works which in the past attempted to survey this field systematically are now outdated and inadequate, \(^{49}\) and coverage remains in many respects sporadic. \(^{50}\) A systematic and comprehensive study remains very much a desideratum. \(^{51}\)

\(^{43}\) Kotsifou 2012a, 2012b, 2012c.

\(^{44}\) Chaniotis 2012a; Salvo 2012.

\(^{45}\) Chaniotis 2012a, 2012c; Martzavou 2012a, 2012b; Chaniotis 2015.

\(^{46}\) Davies, this volume, p. 159.

\(^{47}\) See Chaniotis 2012b, 18, 27; Masségia 2012a, 137–139, 2012c.

\(^{48}\) See especially the recent contributions of Masségia 2012c, 2013; Bobou 2013.

\(^{49}\) Sittl 1890; Neumann 1965. On body language in general (chiefly in literary sources), see Maier-Eichhorn 1989; Bremmer and Roedenburg 1991; Lateiner 1995; Aldrete 1999; Boegh 1999; Lobe 1999; Riccotti 2000; Fögen 2001; Llewellyn-Jones 2003; Corbeil 2004; D. L. Cairns 2005. Among works on emotion expression in particular, one might single out Halliwell 2008 (on Greek laughter), Beard 2014 (on Roman); on tears, see the chapters in Fögen 2009.

\(^{50}\) As well as the works cited in n. 48, note also e.g. Davies 1985, 1994, 1997, 2002, 2005; McNiven 2000 (and his unpublished 1982 dissertation). For Roman art, Brilliant 1963 remains valuable. See also Kenner 1960 on laughter and tears in Greek art.

\(^{51}\) There is a partial exception in the well-studied phenomenon of grief and mourning in ancient visual culture: see e.g. (on Greek art) Shapiro 1991; Huber 2001; Oakley 2004. This belongs with a long-standing tradition of studies of (especially Greek) lamentation (see Alexiou 1974/2002; Holst-Warhaft 1992; Schauer 2002; Dué 2002, 2006; Suter 2008) and funeral...
Angelos Chaniotis’ chapter in this volume indicates another fruitful approach in this connection, in so far as it represents a growing tendency to consider the products of the visual arts not just in their own right, as evidence for the depiction of emotion, but (as far as possible) in their wider original context, as functional objects in specific physical and cultural settings: statues not only represent emotional experience, but also express emotional commitment and elicit emotional responses. Chaniotis’ study, in this volume, of the multiple ways in which the dedication of a statue provides evidence for aspects of ancient affectivity complements earlier studies on the emotional dimensions of sanctuaries and other locations for ritual performance.\(^{52}\) Epigraphic texts, dedications, religious architecture, and the configuration of the site more generally all contribute to the creation of a shared space for emotional experience and emotional performance, a locus for the enactment of the emotions – awe, fear, wonder, respect, hope, gratitude, and so on – on which religious experience depends.\(^{53}\) Such an orientation reflects the turn towards materiality in archaeology and ancient history more broadly, a concern that is also manifest in studies that focus more generally on the affective implications of human beings’ interaction with objects and artefacts.\(^{54}\)

This is not an approach, however, that needs to restrict itself to material evidence alone. The literary texts that have dominated the study of ancient emotions to date also have a great deal to offer those who wish to investigate the concrete physicality of ancient emotions as aspects of the ways in which embodied human beings interact with the world and the objects that it contains. This is partly a consequence of the fact that literary sources are rich in representations of the objects, artefacts, spaces, symptoms, movements, postures, and gestures through which emotions can be expressed, symbolized, constructed, and elicited.\(^{55}\) But it is also significant that there is a very real sense in which there is no absolute gulf between the material and the textual, the physical and the mental, in the study of emotion. To quote Cairns’s chapter in this volume:

The importance of emotional symptoms in the construction of emotional concepts underlines the fundamental importance of physical embodiment in the concept of emotion itself. In the case of phrikê, the symptom is one that has its roots in basic somatic mechanisms of temperature regulation, that is manifested in a range of non-emotional contexts, and that is shared with other animals. From these materials, universal in humans and extending beyond the human species, is constructed an emotional concept in which physical symptoms are intimately related to cognitive appraisals and evaluations. The mechanism by which this occurs is the universal one of metonymy, by which the name of the symptom comes to function as a name of the emotion. The concept of phrikê is typical in locating the language and thought of emotion.

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53 Cf. e.g. Masséglia 2012b.
54 See e.g. Masséglia 2012a, 2012b; Bourbou 2013. For theoretical perspectives on materiality and cognition, see e.g. Appadurai 1986; Brown 2004; Bennett 2010; Malafouris 2013; Boscagli 2014.
55 Cf. the works cited in n. 49 above on body language, and cf. (on objects) Mueller 2016.
tion in embodied physical experience. There is nothing in any way surprising or unfamiliar about this – the point is precisely that ancient Greek emotional concepts are, to large extent, built up out of the same materials as our own, materials that draw on our experience as physically embodied beings interacting with our physical and social environments. What needs to be emphasized, however, is that this experiential, embodied nature of emotion is not just an aspect of a shared biological substratum; it is a feature also of language and of thought. It is not that embodiment is relevant only in terms of emotions’ physical changes, symptoms, and expressions and is left behind when emotional concepts take root in language, thought, and culture. There is no disjunction, but rather a fundamental continuity between emotions as physical experiences and emotional concepts as linguistic and cultural categories. In terms of the development of emotional concepts, there is no wedge to be driven between the body, on the one hand, and language and culture on the other.

Mechanisms of thought, such as metonymy and metaphor, regularly bring the body and its interactions with the material and social environments into the language and thought of emotion. A growing number of studies are beginning to explore what metaphor can tell us about the conceptualization of emotion in ancient Greek and Roman societies. To say ‘I shudder’ rather than merely ‘I am afraid’ is to give a more vivid and immediate sense of the emotion as a holistic, embodied experience; to present the onset of grief as the feeling of being suddenly enveloped in a cloud or a garment presents an individual’s emotion in terms of a shared cultural model of what that emotion feels like to a subject (and links it to the visible expression of the emotion in body language and dress). When Achilles wishes that anger (cholos) would disappear from the world, that anger that is sweeter than liquid honey and expands like smoke in a man’s chest (Iliad 18.107–110), he is, to be sure, telling us what anger has felt like to him, but he does so in a way that draws on his culture’s metaphorical models of emotional experience (e.g. as the movement of gases and fluids in a container), so that his description is meaningful also in terms of the conceptual schemas that the poem’s audiences use to articulate their own subjective experiences. The similarity between these schemas and those that are currently in use in modern societies will at least partly reflect the constraints that actual physiology, symptomatology, and other features of human embodiment place on metaphors and metonymies that depend on embodiment.

As Angelos Chaniotis has pointed out, ‘the ancient historian cannot study what people really felt’; but the ancient experience of emotion is not completely inaccessible to us, at least in so far as we can study shared cultural models of emotion phenomenology via their representation in the intersubjective medium of


57 See D. L. Cairns 2013a and in this volume on shudders (phrikē) and 2016a on clouds and garments.

58 Chaniotis 2012, 94.
language, and especially in the use of metaphor. Almost always, these metaphors will be conventional, or at least not unique to individuals; very often, they will reflect not subjective experience as such, but shared models of the forms that subjective experience was expected to take. In this way, however, metaphor gets us from what cannot be studied historically – the totality of living human beings’ actual subjective experience of affective events and states (that ‘indefinite multiplicity of pathē’ mentioned in *On the Sublime* 22.1) – to what can, the representation of subjective experience in language.

There are complex issues to be explored here, in emotion research in general, about the links between physical experience, observing and thinking about physical experience, responding emotionally to others’ embodied experience, and the creation and reception of verbal and visual narratives of physical experience, especially in terms of possible connections between the representation of the subjective phenomenology of emotion in language, thought, and narrative and the emotional responses of the recipients and audiences of such language, mental representations, and narratives. 59 We have touched on these issues already above, with regard to the emotional responses of audiences and readers. ‘Longinus’ is one of many ancient authors who exhibits a pronounced interest in how the representation of embodied experience in literature appeals to the emotions of readers and audiences: Halliwell’s discussion in this volume brings out the author’s sense of a symmetry between vivid representation of physical experience in texts and the physicality of an audience’s emotional response (and similarly highlights the role of metaphor in mediating that symmetry). 60 One of the sub-issues in this domain, concerning the relation between physical and mental or ‘social’ pain, 61 and thus between the emotional pain that an observer feels at the physical pain of another, 62 is raised in the pseudo-Aristotelian *Problemata* and discussed in Fortenbaugh’s chapter in this volume. 63 The author of the Peripatetic treatise is puzzled by a question that remains an issue of contemporary scientific discussion.

But these issues ultimately raise a more fundamental question concerning the utility of the antithesis between mind and body when it comes to thinking about emotion as one of the ways in which human beings (and other organisms) make sense of their environments. The *phrikē* that registers a difference in temperature between an organism and its surroundings is a primary way in which that organism makes sense of the world; the same embodied sense-making capacities remain implicated when *phrikē* responds (e.g.) to presumed signs of divine presence or to the convincing representation of human suffering in the theatre, though the latter

59 See e.g. Oatley 2011, 111–114; Wojciechowski and Gallese 2011 (with bibliography on the wider issues in terms of mirror neurons, embodied simulation, etc.). On the issue of whether metaphors which draw on embodied experience involve embodied simulation of that experience in the brain, see the studies cited in D. L. Cairns 2014, nn. 5–8.
61 See (for different views) Eisenberger 2012; Woo et alii 2014.
63 See Fortenbaugh, this volume, pp. 125-142.
clearly involve much more in the way of affective and cognitive processing. At both ends of the scale, in non-human animals and in human beings, *phrikē* is an experience of a body that is simultaneously an experience of the world. The body’s sense-making capacities are involved at all levels; they remain involved when symptoms of this type, the primary sense-making capacities that they reflect, and other embodied forms of experience are used to construct the metonyms and metaphors that structure emotion concepts. At all levels, these phenomena reflect the fact that cognition is embodied and that cognition and affectivity are inextricably linked as aspects of the single complex system that is the living organism.  

If we as Classicists can insist on the extent to which our discipline, too, focuses on embodied, embedded, and enactive aspects of emotion, then we can engage in meaningful dialogue with emotion researchers in a variety of other disciplines, while also seeking to pursue a dialogue within our own discipline in synthesizing the material, visual, and textual data that the ancient evidence has to offer.

In studying the emotions of the ancient Greeks and Romans we already engage in cross-cultural comparison: none of us is an ancient Greek or an ancient Roman. In bringing this comparative and historicizing impetus to bear Classicists are already in a position to supply perspectives that are too often overlooked in other branches of emotion research. We do this well when we interrogate to the best of our abilities the linguistic, social, and cultural habits that inform our own and our own societies’ views about emotion. But we can also do more. It is a virtue of the current volume that so many of our contributors (especially Battistella and Nelis, Halliwell, and Munteanu) treat both Greek and Roman evidence – an obvious cultural interface which is too often overlooked and which should much more regularly form the focus of our investigations.

Other comparators readily suggest themselves: conferences and workshops have begun to examine similarities and differences between Greek and Arabic, Greek and Chinese classical traditions; and a new international research network has been set up to examine the interface between ancient Greek and Byzantine affectivity, taking into account also the influence of Christianity and Islam and Byzantium’s relations with the Mediaeval West.

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65 See now the essays collected in Cairns and Fulkerson 2015a. For recent studies that also engineer an explicit confrontation between the affective worlds of Greek and Roman societies, cf. Konstan 2010 and Fulkerson 2013.

66 For the former project, see http://nyuad.nyu.edu/en/news-events/abu-dhabi-events/2015/02/emotions-across-cultures.html, with working papers at https://archive.nyu.edu/handle/2451/33966. For ancient Greek and Chinese emotions in an intellectual-historical context, involving also discussions of Mediaeval, Early-Modern, and Modern Europe, see https://emma.hypotheses.org/histoire-intellectuelle-des-emotions, now published as Boquet and Nagy 2016.

67 See http://emotions.shca.ed.ac.uk/.