NORM AND EXERCISE: A USEFUL PAIR OF LENSES –
AN INTRODUCTION

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1. ASCETICISM OR MONASTICISM?

In his famous study *The End of Ancient Christianity*, Robert A. Markus writes about an ‘explosion of asceticism’;¹ nine years later, in 1999, Andrea Giardina entitled one of his articles ‘Esplosione di tardoantico’.² These two explosions are decidedly different, though still linked, as the explosion of studies on late antiquity analyzed by Giardina is exactly the same historic period in which Markus holds that the greatest manifestation of forms of ascetic life are recorded. In 2005, when a collection of studies in honour of Elizabeth A. Clark was published, it was asceticism, along with gender studies and historiography, which indicated the historiographic period under consideration.³ Indeed, the editors believed that the skill of this eminent American scholar stood out for having offered a new reading of late antiquity, focusing attention on these three aspects and then passing them through the filter of the ‘cultural turn’.⁴ If we then look closely at the series of the fifteen published essays, despite the fact that the work is divided into three sections, each of which is dedicated to one of the three thematic areas of Clark’s research (asceticism, gender and historiography), at least half contain direct references to asceticism in their titles, and thus not only those that are gathered in that specific section. It is as if asceticism is not easily contained and indelibly colours a great many aspects of the history of late antiquity. This undisputed trend, which continues well beyond the *Festschrift* in honour of Elizabeth A. Clark, carries with it an element that is too often neglected, but which has important consequences for the study of ascetic ways of life in the late antiquity of the Mediterranean (and not only). Reading the titles of the essays in the aforementioned collection or, for example, those in a more recent volume on the reception of the New Testament in antique ascetic literature,⁵ we clearly see how

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¹ Markus 1990, 81.
² Giardina 1999. In truth, this argument was already anticipated and analyzed by Reinhart Herzog in a conference in 1986, wherein, well before others and quite acutely, the growing interest in late antiquity was focused upon. According to Herzog this phenomenon was due both to the individual and collective perception of late twentieth century modernity as a period of crisis not unlike that which was seen following the end of the Mediterranean Roman Empire, and to the desire on the part of cultural and political institutions to find answers for today in the past (Herzog 1987). On the interweaving of scientific and political issues in the study of late antiquity, see also Cameron 2004, 73–4.
³ Martin and Miller 2005.
⁴ Martin and Miller 2005, 7–9; Chaney 1994.
⁵ Weidemann 2013.
the proliferation of asceticism has always been understood as the proliferation of both asceticism and monasticism, almost as if this terminological pair is always and uncritically to be considered a hendiadys. As if to say: monasticism and asceticism are the same thing. This observation could also be applied to the present work that I have edited, as the title only uses the word ‘asceticism’, but looking at the titles of the single essays we see that many are dedicated to people and texts that are clearly monastic. We will return to this point below. First, however, it would be helpful to explain how asceticism and monasticism can also not be exactly the same thing.

A good starting point is Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), who picked up the idea from Baruch Spinoza (1632–1677) that it is human nature to represent one’s actions based on intentions, and therefore to identify thought in general with conscious thought. Yet this habit of human beings is neither arbitrary nor accidental, but rather ‘the tragic inability to forbear the fiction of an intended happening, to which the precarious animal man must turn in order to preserve himself’. 6 This principle, however, is considered valid, and thus natural, only within daily life and the many actions that distinguish it. But human beings can (and must) aspire too to a superior form of knowledge, a conscious knowledge that is, according to Spinoza, qualitatively opposed to affections, in that it is equipped with ‘the imperturbable causal necessity, free from all one-sidedness, the source of fear and trembling’. 7

The superior or conscious knowledge, which is distinguished from the common one, falsely considered intentioned, is that which makes human beings different from other animals and which gives a sense to our existence.

This condition, which potentially gives strength to a ‘free’ choice, is that which Nietzsche calls the ascetic ideal: ‘except for the ascetic ideal: man, the animal man, had no meaning up to now. His existence on earth had no purpose’. 8 Going without, self depravation, fleeing from the world, according to Nietzsche, are not an indication of poverty, but rather of the self-sufficiency of life, as the ascetic takes himself out of the lien of the ‘condemning sin’, placing himself beyond good and bad, disintegrating the moral, self-styled Christian from the world. The ascetic way of life is therefore ‘beyond man’, that is to say that it is for the man who is able to accept the finitude not as a sign of defectiveness that leads to subjection to another principle, but as a condition of his own power’. 9 In other words, the ascetic way of life implies a metaphysical idea of the world which has as its fulcrum the end of the world, as a complete vision of the world is always obtained ‘in the point in time that closes all time’ and ‘only with the apocalyptic halt of becoming is the “unconditioned condition” manifested, to which regression vainly tends without end’. 10

In this futility of continual regression lies the sense of the ascetic way of life. The ‘rule of the world’, on the other hand, imposes this continual regression to the prime condition, when an ethic improvement seems to be requested.

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6  Di Marco 1984, 73.
7  Di Marco 1984, 72.
8  Nietzsche 1994, 127.
9  Di Marco 1984, 38.
10  Virno 2015, 40.
But if this is asceticism, that is, a condition that goes beyond that of a human being immersed in the illusion of the world, then what is monasticism? One could say that the monastic way of life is found between these two conditions described so far (worldly humanity and ascetic beyond-humanity): a monk aims to reject the illusion of the world, but at the same time it seems that he cannot do without the tools of the world, such as regressing to the prime condition or the necessity of a series of auctoritates from the (more or less recent) past who act as the number zero on the monk’s timepiece. This is because, like all things in the world, even a monk needs to be measured and thus put into a space (both ideal and physical) that can perfectly and precisely contain him according to the measures that have already been previously established. A striking example is found in the genealogies of varying degrees of holiness wherein, for example, the apostolic community described in the Acts of the Apostles, Antony, and the heroes Martin and Benedict all become the supposed unconditioned conditions, the origin.\footnote{On the monastic genealogies, see Alciati 2011 and 2018, 41–61. Regarding the degree to which the concept of ‘primitive’ or ‘original model’ is artificial, though still a necessary fiction for giving sense to the order of things in which human beings are immersed, see Kuper 1988. For the persistence of this process, especially within the Christian religious system, see Miccoli 1960.}

Just as Nietzsche writes regarding the genealogy of morality, in these cases as well the construction of a sequence, presented as an attempt at identifying the essence of the phenomenon, in the sense of a final justification as well as an origin that can be considered perfect, is rather the tool that calls out the arbitrary nature of every origin, according to which the adherents appreciate and denigrate certain types of conduct and, consequently, elevate the presumed rules that govern them to Principles.\footnote{Giacomini 2015.}

Those who practice an ascetic way of life, on the other hand, place their own origins, as it were, beyond the measurable world and thus before the zero. That which counts is not the series of models to retrospectively retrace, as this way of life comes directly (and mysteriously) from God. Though even the ascetics are forced to live on this world, more than everyone else they understand the limit and the anguish of this temporary collocation, and they direct everything towards the union with the divinity, which will happen in full only in the restoration of the last day. To continue using the time metaphor, those who practice the ascetic way of life do not turn back to bring order to the gallery of the ‘fathers’, but instead always look forward, forcing themselves to go beyond the confines of any and all units of measure. We might say that: as the art of measuring is to the monastic way of life, so is the art of knowing to that of the ascetic.\footnote{This perspective not only implies an irreversible fracture between asceticism and monasticism, but it also assigns the first with a universal value that is not exclusively religious, in accordance with an interpretative approach that goes from William James (1842–1910) to Peter Sloterdijk (1947).}

A large part of this theoretical approach is found in a condensed form, more or less explicitly, in a book published by Geoffrey G. Harpham in 1987 titled The Ascetic Imperative in Culture and Criticism. Despite the book’s being chronologically placed in the period characterized by the ‘explosion of asceticism’, by
choosing the story of Antony and the solitary life of Egypt in the fourth century as his starting point, Harpham forces himself to go beyond the temporal limits of late antiquity, omitting the details (and presumed extraordinary nature) of the history of Christianity and addressing himself to a wider audience, with the aim of showing the trans-cultural dimension, which is thus universal, of the ascetic way of life.

This book, in spite of some limitations it registers regarding ‘the facts’ that specialist period historians should be fussy about, actually broadens the scope and relevance of asceticism far beyond anything accomplished in published scholarship – especially historical and philological work – on the subject to date.14

This quote is from the review of the paperback edition written by Vincent L. Wimbush, probably the most famous scholar on asceticism who, in exactly the same period, formed an interdisciplinary research group on the topic. A comparison between the two scholars is interesting in order to better understand the possible boundaries between asceticism and monasticism.15

In 1985, within the Institute for Antiquity and Christianity of Clermont, Wimbush founded a research group called ‘Ascetic Group’: at first the group was joined by leading scholars on early Christianity and, more generally, on late antiquity. The first results of this group are represented in an anthology of Christian texts that are translated with commentary, but the choice of texts and the skilful combination thereof aimed to show the impossibility of understanding the enormity of this phenomenon while limiting the study to the antique Mediterranean.16 As if it were an upward spiral, this urgency became ever more pressing and the group’s second publication,17 despite the fact that the focus is still on antique Christian literature, included a response from none other than Harpham, who gave new life to the research starting from the title of his piece, which was particularly well received: ‘Old Water in New Bottles’.18 The conclusions reached by Harpham, that asceticism is not only monasticism and that its study must break through both the disciplinary boundaries (early Christianity vs. comparative history of religions) and the hermeneutic boundaries (ethics, linguistics, political theory, gender formation, racial categories, etc.), find confirmation in the group’s third publication, where comparative readings confront Christianity, Judaism and Buddhism.19 Yet the project reached its peak in the organization of an international conference at the Union Theological Seminary of New York in 1993, where numerous specialists of different historical periods and religious systems came together under the guidance of Wimbush and Richard Valantasis. The publication of the proceedings, ‘under the deceptively

14 WIMBUS 1996, 387.
15 The appreciation for these two scholars by the late antiquity community – and in particular by scholars of early Christianity – is quite different. While Wimbush now seems to be an indispensable author and very nearly a benchmark, references to Harpham are much rarer. The fleeting ‘evocation’ in ROUSSEAU 2004 is emblematic, and remains to date the most detailed study on the current state of research into ancient Mediterranean asceticism.
16 WIMBUS 1990. On the history of this group see VAAGE AND WIMBUS 1999.
simple title *Asceticism*,

as Martin writes, ‘constitute[s] a remarkable testament to the growth of interest in asceticism and to the value of comparative approaches’.21

The path of research undertaken by Wimbush will have important consequences: it is as if, from that moment on, that which specialists from different disciplines knew were all brought together, with repercussions that had been neglected to that point. *Asceticism* does not begin with a definition, even just a working definition that would thus be open to criticism, of the concept; rather, the editors hope that the confrontation between different specialist areas might blow up all of the widespread notions of asceticism that always try to anchor it to a particular intellectual system and highlight the peculiarity, or the ‘coloration’, that it takes on within the diverse contexts examined. 22 We see once again the return of the explosion metaphor, used here however not as a proliferation of something, but as a dissolution and anti-essentialist fragmentation.

The editors’ decision not to define asceticism (and thus not to propose any distinction, for example, between asceticism and monasticism) is better understood when considering the noteworthy presence of Harpham within the volume. Many of the authors feel obliged to confront their work with their colleague’s book (always defined as ‘provocative’ or in similar terms), but nearly all of them tend to show the limits, or the precarious applicability, of his idea of asceticism to the various, and highly specialized, historical contexts. That which Wimbush exalted in his review of the book is not found much within the pages of *Asceticism*, which include an essay by Harpham himself, perhaps even more ‘provocative’ than his book from 1987. He writes:

I am beginning with two premises. The first is that aesthetics is not merely a modern name for an aspect of asceticism, but constitutes asceticism’s specifically modern form – its modernity. The second is that asceticism brings pressure to bear upon the very concept of art precisely insofar as art is modern. 23

It is important to note that Harpham, insisting on modernity, makes no reference to contemporary monasticism: for him, quite simply, the ascetic culture of modernity is to be found elsewhere. Whether it be art or other expressions of human culture, it certainly is not the monastic way of life (which obviously, genealogically, claims its derivation from Antony, Pachomius, Benedict, etc.) that best shows the persistence of asceticism; in other words, monasticism is not necessarily asceticism.

In light of these theoretical premises, the essays gathered in this book aim to contribute further to showing how much the Wimbush-Harpham line of thinking is still extremely fertile and useful in overcoming the opposite excesses (phenomenological essentialism and historical specificity) and to aim for a minimal and shared definition of asceticism (and thus also of monasticism). In the two paragraphs that follow I will show how the choice of two sufficiently generic and universally recognizable signifiers, ‘norm’ and ‘exercise’, can be useful in this sense, especially
when related to the concept of ‘ascetology’ proposed by Emiliano R. Urciuoli and that of the ‘bodymap’ described by Gian Antonio Gilli.

If we look once again at the volume Asceticism, the terms ‘norm’ and ‘exercise’ are not given significant importance. ‘Norm’, for example, is found only once in an important way, in contrast to ‘neurosis’ and with the following explanation: ‘perhaps neurosis is just a modern term for heresy, since ascetic behaviour, either of the world-affirming or world-denying sort, appears to be a significant departure from the modern term for orthodoxy: “the norm”’. 24 ‘Exercise’, on the other hand, is much more present, being quite simply the modern equivalent of the Greek askesis, though still in this case as well it is not used very significantly. Two uses of this word bear mention. The first is a quote from the History of Sexuality by Michel Foucault, where we read that ‘no professional skill can be acquired without exercise; neither can one learn the art of living, the Techne tou biou, without an askesis which must be taken as a training of oneself by oneself’. 25 The second refers to the research of Alayne Yates on eating disorders, which shows that

when eating-disordered women and obligatory runners combine diet and exercise in an effort to become healthy, thin, or even younger, the patter of diminished intake and heightened output seems to regenerate and reinforce itself and the system becomes remarkably resistant to change. 26

These two affirmations, when used as a filter through which to examine the ascetic ways of life allow us to see two recurrent traits that are present in the ascetic way of life, especially when understood à la Harpham.

2. NORM

Despite the distinction that has just been made between asceticism and monasticism, using the word ‘norm’ in this context immediately brings to mind the word ‘rule’, as there is no model, in common terms, for a model of regulated life that is comparable to that of the monks who, obviously, live according to a rule. Nonetheless, just like asceticism and monasticism, the word ‘norm’ also requires some preliminary clarification, especially in relation to its presumptive synonym ‘rule’. In general terms, we can say that, among all of the religious ways of life, the ascetic appears to be the most obdurate to being regulated. The simple fact of defining oneself fuga mundi, cannot help but induce the observer to understand it as the space of anomy. The self-perception of the ascetic as he who lives in the space of anomy par excellence, the desert – be it real or symbolic – produces in the observer, especially when looking over centuries and through literary mediation, an optical illusion: the ascetic is that which he claims to be.

This is not the space to provide useful material on the scholarly philosophical debate – which has been on-going since at least the times of Plato’s Euthyphro – on

24 Corrington-Streeete 1998, 123.
the forms and value of the norm;\textsuperscript{27} the intention is, more modestly, to reflect upon
how establishing a norm always means to prepare a series of precepts and disposi-
tions that consent the governing of one or more human beings. The underlying idea
is that there can be no governing if those who govern do not relate their actions to a
set of real understandings that do not depend on the will and whim of he who makes
the norm, but rather on a rational and relational structure recognized by those who
abide by the norm.\textsuperscript{28} But these calls to rationality and to the truth hide the natural-
ization of an act of arbitrariness, that is, the necessary differentiation operations
through which an attempt has been made to establish proportions and hierarchical
relationships since time immemorial: there is always \textit{the} norm among the many
norms. And above all, there is always some authority who, through such operations,
aims to impose a specific point of view, manipulating the logical and argumentative
resources provided by the \textit{doxa} that is shared by the group of social agents, in this
way attempting to construct and teach (Pierre Bourdieu would say ‘to incorporate’) a
personal set of truths and structures of significance.

But every form of coercion that reaches its goals always implies a certain amount
of violence – and it is irrelevant, in light of the objective, whether it be physical or
symbolic – under the guise of the consent that the dominated cannot help but show
to the dominant, and thus to the act of dominance exerted through the imposition of
a norm.\textsuperscript{29} ‘To follow a norm’ therefore implies a problem of persuasion: the stated
impositions appear to be more convincing the more they are understood as being
necessary to the adaptation to particular principles of a vision and division of the
world (and thus necessary for their being perceived as adequate).\textsuperscript{30}

An example of this phenomenon is found in Cassian’s \textit{Institutiones}. Describing
the Christian community of Alexandria, Cassian affirms that some of them were
already called \textit{monachi}, and that Mark himself, the evangelist who is traditionally
considered the first bishop of the city, had given them a specific \textit{norma vivendi}.
As we have already seen, here is the appearance of a genealogy, which, from Mark,
comes into the hands of the monks met by Cassian at the end of the fourth century.
This norm, however, proves to be precarious because, for example, it does not deal
adequately with the way in which one must pray. Each monk thus considered it his

\textsuperscript{27} For a good introduction to the problem, see \textit{Lundgreen} 2017; \textit{Möllers} 2015; \textit{Scarcini} 2012.

\textsuperscript{28} According to the model proposed by \textit{Foucault} 2012, 23–24.

\textsuperscript{29} The result is that the dominated consider their condition of exclusion by the group of domina-
tors as legitimate, that is that they consider themselves unworthy of such a position because
they are unable to conform to the practices laid out by the norm, always understood as ‘the
inevitable natural order of things’, ‘when the schemes they implement in order to perceive
and evaluate themselves or to perceive and evaluate the dominators (high/low, male/female,
white/black, etc.) are the product of the incorporation of the (thus naturalized) classifications of
which their social being is the product’ (\textit{Bourdieu} 2000, 170).

\textsuperscript{30} The relationship between perception and persuasion is fundamental for a prescriptive imposi-
tion to be successful. For a different perspective, which has the concept of expectations as its
starting point (but which reaches similar conclusions), see \textit{Bicchieri} and \textit{Muldoon} 2014. For
how persuasion is not obtained by supposing a moral and rational value to just any norm, but
rather on the relatedness on the possibility of a different understanding of the world (\textit{Weltbe-
schaftenheit}) see \textit{Möllers} 2015, 13–4.
prerogative to extend the prayer on the basis of his own faith and physical strength. One day, however, one of these monachi stood up and began to sing a psalm, followed by another, then ten more, eleven and twelve: at that point he stopped and sang the *Hallelujah*, before vanishing. Everyone understood then that the man had actually been an angel sent by God to establish the canon for prayer.31

Another example is found instead in the first of his twenty-four conversations with elderly monks from the Egyptian desert (the *Conlutiones patrum*).

The end goal of our profession [or the ascetic profession] is the kingdom of God or the kingdom of Heaven, while the immediate goal is purity of heart, without which none can reach that end. Well concentrated on the objective, let us proceed and direct the direction of our gaze with righteousness as if we had to follow a precise path. And if our thoughts should go astray even slightly from this path, we will immediately turn back to contemplate that objective once again, as if we were justifiably following a kind of norm, one which immediately reveals itself if our minds deviate even a little from the pre-established direction, thus recalling all of our efforts ever towards this sole objective.32

The norm is not necessarily defined in detail, but it always acts as a peremptory reminder of the ‘need to be’, which cannot be pronounced simply, but must be constantly put in place.

The norm therefore imposes a certain ‘action’ with the view towards an end: the actions, however, are negotiable while the latter is not. Indeed, those who zealously apply themselves and know all of the exercises imposed by the ascetic way of life, but disregard the end for which all of this is undertaken, toil in vain: only those who follow a norm, that is a way to put the necessary exercises into practice, can continue on the path without wasting energy and erring, thus arriving at the desired end.33 The extraordinary nature of the way of life of those who refuse the world cannot self-regulate and there is thus always the need of an authority who gives the norm; but this norm cannot but come, in various ways, from God. Self-determination must not be given because it is dangerous and the only bulwark cannot help but be the imposition of a jurisdiction exercised by others.

3. EXERCISE

The norm then serves primarily to govern the exercises, or the series of actions that put human beings into movement (both physically and mentally) to reach a given objective. The ascetic norm thus serves to govern ascetic exercises, which put those human beings who decide to follow this particular way of life in the condition to be able to reach the objective, defined variously and subtly, but which is always the union with the divine, the overcoming of one’s human limits. With this simple comparison we see how the couple ‘norm and exercise’ – just like asceticism! – can take on a universal value, as long as we agree that it is the human being ‘who produces’ the human being through a life of exercises. In this sense, exercise is ‘every

32 Cassian. *Conl.* 1,4,3–4. Translation is mine.
33 Cassian. *Conl.* 1,7,4.
operation through which the qualification of the actor is maintained or improved in light of the successive performance of the same operation, even if this act is not called exercise. That is to say: the practices through which human beings intensify their attention upon themselves produce changes within their very physical nature, in their way of thinking and in the social systems that they are members of.

These are the words of Peter Sloterdijk, one of the living philosophers who has concentrated the most on the significance of exercise. We read the same ideas in Cassian, who unequivocally specifies the risks that the ascetic faces every day. If the typical exercises of this way of life are, as is well known, fasting, prolonged wakefulness, meditation on the sacred texts, a vow of poverty and privation of all forms of wealth, it is important to beware of a widespread misunderstanding. To believe that these practices are the perfection of this way of life, rather than the mere tools used to arrive at the perfection, means not understanding that the end goal of this way of life is not therein, but that only through these tools can one reach the end:

in vain, therefore, does he do these exercises who, satisfied with them as if they were the supreme good, fixes the intent of his heart only on this point and does not extend it to the fulfilment of the end – in light of which these things have been sought – with all of the zeal that it merits; acting thus, he is certainly in possession of the tools of this way of life (disciplina), but he disregards the end in which all profit is found.

The distinction is reiterated several times throughout the work, a sign of how exercise is so ingrained in human nature that it becomes, albeit in an extreme condition of life that is incomparable to that ‘of the world’, the true sense of living. This is why, according to the most expert ascetics, a norm is necessary. In other words, no exercise is good or bad in and of itself; but it must be meditated on and then put into practice, despite the fact that different, even conflicting, opinions may come up about it: all of the opinions can be deemed reasonable, either completely or only in part, and therefore accepted without any harm to the objective. This means that it is the norm that defines a good or bad exercise, or that renders a mere tool either useful or not for a given purpose.

Doing exercises therefore means to move the body in a certain way and with a certain regularity in order to reach a given end, but for Cassian (and many others) exercising has to do with both the exterior and the interior of the body contemporaneously, or the two parts of the body: the visible and invisible. Regularity ensures that every exercise becomes easier once the initial difficulty has passed, conditioning the body to always doing to the same movement.

Cassian and Sloterdijk thus agree on an essential point: exercise is not a diversion (or a hobby, as it were, an extra choice that is thus reversible), but rather a constant for human beings. In this sense, this is why Sloterdijk can call the entirety of these exercises ‘anthropotechnics’, or that production technique that follows a norm which renders them recognized and recognizable as such. And thus is explained the

35 Cassian. Conl. 1,7,4. Translation is mine.
36 See, on this, Cassian. Conl. 8,4,1 and 17,28.
symbiosis between technique (or exercises) and norm, changing which means changing anthropotechnics: leaving the ascetic desert necessarily means that the exercises change and therefore the very nature of the products of that particular anthropotechnics also changes.

Putting regulated exercises into practice in a certain way determines the possibility of reaching a precise objective that is more or less shared, but the success of this ‘path’ depends on the quality of the norm and on the quality of the exercise. Here the variety of ascetic lifestyles comes into play as does the mapping, as it were, of the differences in time and space.

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