PREFACE

This study represents a thoroughly revised and enlarged version of the Serbian edition *Platon i demokratski koreni tiranskog čoveka. Studije o kneževskom ogledalu, antidemokratskoj teoriji i tiranskoj tipologiji u klasičnoj Grčkoj*, Beograd 2015, 216 pp.

My research on tyranny in the late fifth and early fourth century led to a first brief encounter with Plato and the right of the stronger. It was illuminating and at the same time intimidating, as it raised more questions than answers. However, the final spark which ignited this project was the work on Aristotle's concept of extreme tyranny. There are three main reasons why it has taken me a long time to write this book. One is that for me as a historian, the field of philosophy was and in many ways has remained terra incognita.

Another reason is that at the time I was also working on two other books. The post-communist and post-war situation in Serbia necessitated writing a history of the Ancient Greeks (*Stari Grci. Portret jednog naroda*, Beograd 2011, 534 pp.). Its aim was to provide undergraduate and graduate students with an up-to-date study of Greek history from the earliest times to Alexander the Great. The subsequent research on Plato encouraged critical engagement with Xenophon's political thought. This led not only to a new book project but to the postponement of the present study, as the work on Xenophon gave me a better understanding of Plato and vice-versa. As the manuscript on Xenophon is now at an advanced stage, I sincerely hope it will appear in the not too distant future.

The last reason was that more than 70% of the research literature included in this book is not available in Serbian libraries. Thus, progress depended in many ways on the help of others. My colleagues Svetozar Boškov, Ivana Dobrivojević and Boris Stojkovski were kind enough to copy many works while on sabbaticals or short trips abroad. Nonetheless, this study would be unthinkable without the assistance of various grants. The Fondation Hardt afforded me two short stays in its most beautiful surroundings. A generous fellowship from the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung allowed me three longer visits to Bielefeld. Thanks to colleagues at the University, above all Uwe Walter, Bielefeld will always be remembered as a contemporary 'Shangri-La'. The inspiring blend of intellectual challenge and friendship helped greatly in the completion of the manuscript.

An early draft of the manuscript was read by Kurt Raaflaub. His critical reading was an invaluable aid for improving and streamlining both style and content. The comments of Marijana Ricl to the Serbian edition proved very instructive. Uwe Walter and Kai Trampedach graciously read the manuscript in its advanced phase and their insightful suggestions helped sharpen my understanding of many issues.

I am deeply grateful to the editors, in particular Kai Trampedach, for the opportunity to publish my book in the Studies in Ancient Monarchies series, and for the useful remarks and suggestions. The staff of the Franz Steiner Verlag – Katharina Stüdemann and Andrea Hoffmann – have made this an ideal publishing experience.

Since English is not my native language I am indebted to Alexandra and Mary Popović, who improved my many linguistic shortcomings and errors.

Some chapters of the volume drew on my own previously published material: '*Bios Praktikos* and *Bios Theoretikos* in Plato's *Gorgias*', in: A. Stavru – C. Moore (eds.), *Socrates and the Socratic Dialogue*, Leiden: Brill, 2018, 369–385; 'Platons Kritik des demokratischen Konzepts der *Freiheit zu tun, was man will*', in: Jordović I. – Walter U. (eds.), *Feindbild und Vorbild. Die athenische Demokratie und ihre intellektuellen Gegner*, Historische Zeitschrift Beihefte (Neue Folge) Bd. 74, Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 2018, 183–208. I am much obliged to the publishers of these essays for permission to reuse this material freely in the present study. Translations of ancient and modern texts are given in the bibliography.

I dedicated the Serbian edition to my wife Jelena. My gratitude for her love, patience and support cannot be expressed in words. The English edition I dedicate to Kurt Raaflaub. His numerous studies on Greek political thought have left a lasting impact on me and his readiness to help in word and deeds has been of tremendous importance.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Greeks perceived tyranny as the opposite of any good government, be it democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy or monarchy. Therefore, the study of the typology of tyrants can not only help us to better understand ancient tyranny but also to gain an insight into the evolution of Greek thought in general. Fourth-century Athens holds a key place in this respect for several reasons. On the one hand, the Athenian democracy emerged renewed and strengthened from the late fifth-century turmoil. After its catastrophic defeats in the Peloponnesian War, the loss of its maritime empire and two *coup d'états*, the second of which turned into an open civil war, Athenian democracy proved to be quite stable and resilient. The constitution was slightly reformed and from then onwards democracy became more efficient and less radical. During the better part of the fourth-century the authority of the Athenian demos was undisputed. It was only the defeat in the Lamian War in 322/1 that opened the way for the dissolution of Athenian democracy. On the other hand, the same period saw the strengthening and deepening of antidemocratic thought as well as an increasingly complex and wide-ranging typology of tyrants. Finally, fourth-century Athens saw the emergence of a wide range of texts reflecting on the nature of politics through the figure of the tyrant, the Great King, the tyrannical man etc.

The concurrence of these developments and phenomena cannot be explained away by coincidence. Plato, Xenophon and Isocrates in particular make it evident. All three men were Athenians. Their childhood and youth was marked by the Peloponnesian War, two coups and restoration of democracy. In their writings, they critically assess the way in which the Athenian people rule, without deluding themselves that change in the Athenian political system is possible under the existing circumstances. All three of them are involved in a competitive exchange of ideas, influencing each other through this 'debate'.[1] All three thinkers are among the most important sources for the typology of tyrants in the fourth-century. Finally, Isocrates and Xenophon write texts praising an ideal monarch, and even some Plato's dialogues are to some extent related to this literary genre.

Ancient literary theory paid no serious attention to the so-called *Fürsten-spiegel* genre. As a result, it did not develop a single term for the texts that usually dealt with a single ruler or his successor and expounded the principles and virtues of good government.[2] The modern concept of Mirror of Princes originated in the middle ages (*speculum regale*, *speculum regis*, *speculum morale regium* etc.). The medieval Mirror of Princes genre was not shaped on the model of similar ancient texts. Isocrates' *Cyprian Orations* and Xenophon's *Cyropaedia* did not begin to

1 See Ober 1998: 11, 43–51, 290–351.
2 See Eder 1995b: 157.

attract attention until the Renaissance. Since the medieval genre was an independent new creation, it is not useful in tracing the origin of the ancient type of Mirror of Princes. As opposed to the medieval genre which emerged at a time when monarchy was uncontested, in classical Athens such works were produced at the time of the rule of the people.[3]

Pierre Hadot's argues in his comprehensive study that the Mirror of Princes was widespread in antiquity, even though texts bearing such a title cannot be traced before the twelfth-century AD.[4] Yet, Walter Eder, in his groundbreaking article *Der Fürstenspiegel in der athenischen Demokratie*, justly criticizes Hadot for his too broad and vague appreciation of the Mirror of Princes genre. According to Eder, the criteria of form (prose encomium), of content (praise of an autocrat) and of the practicality of advice reveal that amongst pre-Hellenistic authors only Xenophon's and Isocrates' writings can be classified as Mirror of Princes literature.[5]

The fourth-century has long been misconceived as having been a time of crisis of the Greek polis in general and the Athenian democracy in particular. It has been believed that the inability of the traditional polis to cope with the growing socio-political challenges caused widespread dissatisfaction with the existing socio-political order regardless of individual social status and cultural background; and that, consequently, many turned their back on the traditional, democratic or oligarchic order and embraced the idea that a 'strong man' placed above all social groups and their narrow interests could be the answer to social problems.[6] The fact that tyranny re-emerged in the Greek world after nearly two generations – the last generation of earlier tyrants had been in power in the concluding decade of the fifth-century – has been interpreted as an obvious sign of the crisis. In that regard, it has also been observed that many Athenian intellectuals had ties with the most important protagonists of the later tyrannies (Syracuse, Cyprus, Thessaly, Athens, etc.). All this has given rise to the influential hypothesis that the authors writing in the Mirror of Princes genre longed for a monarchical leadership either in Greece as a whole or in the individual poleis, a hypothesis linked to the assumption that those authors hoped for ruthless tyrants to be turned into good rulers by means of good education.[7]

In the last few decades, this thesis, and thus the basic premise of the theory about the origin of Mirror of Princes, has been effectively challenged.[8] The re-emergence of tyranny cannot be linked to the structural crisis of the polis.[9] In

3 See Eder 1995b: 157–158.
4 See Hadot 1972: 556; *cf*. also Haake 2015: 60, 63–64.
5 See Eder 1995b: 159–160; Nippel 2017: 252–255; *cf*. also Balot 2006: 184–187.
6 See, e.g., Stroheker 1953/54: 381–382; Hadot 1972: 573; Frolov 1974: 401–402, 407–410, 414; Barceló 1993: 246–248.
7 See Hadot 1972: 573–578.
8 See, e.g., Deininger 1993: 55–76; Rhodes 1994: 589–591; Eder 1995a: 11–28; Davies 1995: 29–42.
9 See Jordović 2005.

addition, Eder has raised several important objections.[10] The image of the fifth-century tyrant as a ruthless oppressor of his fellow citizens remained in force in the fourth-century. Despite this markedly negative image, the Athenians did not denounce relations with monarchs and tyrants who ruled far from Attica until after Athens' defeat by Macedonia. Personal contacts with autocrats (Plato's with Syracuse) or their praise (Isocrates' of the rulers of Cyprus) were not condemned or sanctioned. Apparently, the Athenian demos did not perceive such behaviour as a serious threat to its rule. As a matter of fact, contrary to the fifth-century perception, in the fourth-century the demos saw oligarchy, not tyranny, as an antipode of democracy.[11] Furthermore, Plato, Isocrates, Xenophon and Aristotle never advocated a territorial monarchy; their overall political thinking remained bound to an autonomous and self-sufficient polis. Finally, even a cursory review of what Isocrates and Xenophon deem to be the attributes of a good ruler reveals their concurrence with the aristocratic-oligarchic 'canon' of virtue. All this has led Eder to conclude that the origin of the Mirror of Princes genre was closely linked to the specific socio-political situation in Athens, i.e. that the genre in fact reflected aristocratic virtues.[12]

Due to the traumatic events of 411 and 404/3 the Athenian democracy developed a strong distrust of, even aversion to, oligarchic sentiments. The regime of the Thirty Tyrants in particular had made an enduring negative impact. Consequently, in the fourth-century Athenian democracy it seemed less dangerous to eulogise aristocratic virtues by praising ancient and faraway autocracies than by writing in a manner that could have easily been labelled as oligarchic.[13] This is an innovative understanding of Mirror of Princes insofar as it shows that the traditional approach of examining this literary genre, and the typology of tyrants, separately from antidemocratic thought has become obsolete. The *Fürstenspiegel* literary genre cannot be fully understood without taking antidemocratic thought and democratic ideology into account since they are closely linked phenomena.[14]

There is a prevalent opinion in academic circles that several writings of Xenophon and Isocrates may be classified under the Mirror of Princes category. But the opinions diverge widely with regard to Plato. While some, such as Hadot, include Plato among representatives of this literary genre, others, such as Eder, vehemently disagree. Although Eder's view at first seems justified, given the strict criteria he proposes, there are reasons why no study of fourth-century writings which reflect on the nature of politics through the figure of the tyrant, the Great King and the tyrannical man can be considered complete without the famous philosopher. Plato is not just one of the greatest thinkers of his time. He is also, as his dialogues such as the *Gorgias*, *Republic*, *Statesman* and *Laws* show, keenly interested in political thought. More importantly still, Plato's theory about

10 See Eder 1995b: 160–171.
11 See Kaibel 1893: 196; Rhodes 1981: 461–462; Jordović 2006: 31–32.
12 See Eder 1995b: 171–173.
13 See Eder 1995b: 166–173.
14 See, e.g., Barceló 1993; Roberts 1994; Ober 1998; Nadon 2001; Samons 2004; Gray 2010.

how even the best human nature can turn bad and become capable of worst crimes as a result of bad education, and about the emergence of the tyrannical from the democratic man, put the issue of proper education for gifted young people in the centre of Greek political thought. There was just a small step from this position to the question of the virtues of a good ruler.

However, in the recent past some have argued against the existence of the Mirror of Princes as a strictly literary genre.[15] In his stimulating contribution to the concept of the Mirror of Princes in Greco-Roman antiquity, Matthias Haake argues that the strong focus on content and its paraenetic intention has led to the misleading conclusion that a wide range of very different texts can be seen as *Fürstenspiegel*.[16] He starts, following Wolfgang Raible, from the premise that pre-modern texts need to have five constitutive elements to establish a literary genre: the author is seen not as an individual but as a member of a specific social group with a characteristic social role; the addressee is regarded in the same manner; the form of the text; the content of the text; the implied audience of the text. In applying this model it must be observed that the author, addressee and audience constitute the explicit frame of the communicative situation of the text.[17] Regarding this model, Haake deduces that the treatises *Peri Basileias*, whose earliest specimen was in all likelihood Aristotle's *On Kingship*, form a literary genre.[18] The characteristics of this genre are: the authors are always philosophers writing in their social role as intellectuals; the addressees are without exception Hellenistic kings; the form is a self-contained prose text; the content consists not of monarchical theory or concrete instructions for a ruler, but portrays the figure of the good monarch as opposed to the tyrant; the audience is the world of the Hellenistic cities.[19] Concerning the socio-political, cultural and historical context of this genre, Haake concludes that on a highly symbolic level, the treatises *On Kingship* were, like the civic ruler cult, a part of the communication between the cities and the kings in the Hellenistic period.[20] The texts which reflect on monocratical rule (archaic tyrants, Hellenistic kings, Roman emperors etc.), but do not fulfil the above criteria, Haake subsumes under the term monocratological texts.[21] His argument is undoubtedly useful, since it alerts us to the risks of an overly broad understanding of the Mirror of Princes. Nonetheless, this study should show that a strict categorization is not always helpful in grasping the development of political thought.

In ancient Greece there was no profound difference between philosophy and political theory. Since Greek philosophers decisively influenced the development of the field of human thought that is now often subsumed under the term 'political theory', Athenian political and philosophical texts have for a long time been the

15 See E. M. Jónsson 2006: 164; *cf*. Haake 2015: 63–66, esp. 65–66.
16 See Haake 2015: 58–78, esp. 66–73; see also *Id*. 2018: 299–315, esp. 309–315.
17 See Haake 2015: 69–70; Raible 1980.
18 See Haake 2013: 168; *Id*. 2015: 70.
19 See Haacke 2015: 70.
20 See Haacke 2015: 70–72.
21 See Haacke 2015: 73.

subject of study of philosophers and political theorists. By their very nature philosophical and theoretical treatises seek to find eternal truths, be they metaphysical ones or the principles of human political action. However, as much as they strive for objectivity, political philosophers are inevitably embedded in the political realities of their own time, and their work often tends to reflect a desire to change those realities. Such approach to political thought is recognisable even in the works of some of the greatest ancient historians. Whereas the primary focus of the modern historian is to provide an objective and reasonable account of historical events, in ancient Greece that was just one of the purposes of historical writing. Some of the major Greek historians, such as Thucydides, were guided by Cicero's famous motto: *historia magistra vitae est*. Thus Thucydides endeavoured not only to give an accurate account and make sense of historical events but also to understand and provide insight into inherent laws of human history, which is why the famous Athenian historian is said to be one of the precursors of modern political thought.[22] It is not surprising, then, that philosophers and political theorists who study the works of their Greek predecessors tend to focus on what seems to be timeless in their texts and to neglect the historical context in which the texts were created. This, in turn, opens the door to a propensity to read ancient political texts from the perspective of a philosophical tradition that eventually derived from them rather than in the appropriate historical context. It may also promote the perception that more or less fully worked out political theories must precede political practices.[23] As a result, the risk of reading modern mind-sets and values into ancient texts increases. A good example of such tendencies is the so-called *Darker* (*Ironic*) *Reading* of Xenophon's *Hiero* and *Cyropaedia*.[24] Neglecting the political and historical context in which ancient texts were written also results in the tendency to examine them in isolation from one another.

By way of contrast, this study proposes a shift of focus to the historical context. Thus it examines the links between Plato's dialogues and democratic ideology, antidemocratic thought, typology of tyrants and texts traditionally subsumed under the notion of the Mirror of Princes.[25] Undoubtedly Plato's philosophy aimed to give timeless answers to timeless questions. Nonetheless, his horizon of experience was not timeless – his self-limitation to the world of the polis is the best example. More importantly, his formative years were profoundly shaped by widespread and intense turmoil. Plato was born between 428/27 and 425/24,[26] so that his transition from boyhood to manhood saw the annihilation of the Athenian forces in Sicily, the first overthrow and restoration of democracy, the flourishing of the sycophants and Alcibiades' comeback. In his twenties he

22 See Strasburger 1968: 412–476, esp. 413–414, 420, 423–426, 434–435, 437–438, 442–466; Jaeger 1973: 479–489; Ober: 2006: 131–159, esp. 131–136, 153–159.

23 See Vidal-Naquet 1995: 21; Ober 1994b: 154–156.

24 See Gray 2010: 56–67.

25 Regarding notions of ideology and democratic ideology see Ober 1989: 38–40; Raaflaub 2006a: 398–401; Schofield 2006: 282; Jordović – Walter 2018b: 19–33.

26 Diog. Laert. 3.2; see Nails 2002: 243–247.

witnessed Alcibiades' definite downfall, the Arginusae affair, the historic defeat of Athens, the tyranny of the Thirty and Socrates' trial.

Even in the case that the *Seventh Letter* is not authentic, which is not the prevalent opinion,[27] it was written around the middle of the fourth-century by someone who was very familiar with the matter.[28] In this letter the 'Damascene moment' of Plato from *bios politikos* to *bios philosophikos* is explicitly linked to the tyranny of the Thirty and Socrates' trial.[29] During the reign of terror of the Thirty Tyrants, about 2,500 people were executed, some 1,500 of them citizens.[30] Athens had at that time certainly fewer than 30,000 citizens, probably less than 20,000. Some scholars assume that the number could be as low as 13,000.[31] This means that over a period of eight months, around 5–10% of Athenian citizens were murdered as a result of the wave of repression by the Thirty. Not surprisingly, some contemporaries claimed that in eight months they killed almost more Athenians than all the Peloponnesians in the last ten years of the war (413–404).[32] Andrew Wolpert has shown that the numerous and arbitrary executions, the massive expulsions, the ruthless confiscations of property and the deprivation of thousands of Athenians of their civic rights burned deeply into the collective memory.[33]

Every reader of Plato should ask himself how he would react and what impact it would have on his worldview if in his formative years he witnessed at first hand the killing of 5–10% of his fellow adult males – particularly bearing in mind that this happened over a short period of time, without the assistance of modern methods of killing, in a relatively small area and in an open-air society where many citizens knew one another. To this should be added that one of Plato's relatives was the leader of this regime (Critias), while another was a high-ranking member (Charmides).[34]

27 See Aalders 1972: 151–152, 166–167; Knab 2006: 1–6.

28 See Aalders 1972: 148–149; Trampedach 1994: 255–277, esp. 255, 258–259, 276.

29 Pl. *Ep*. 7.324b–326b. For the notion of Damascene moment and Plato see Haake 2009: 118–119.

30 Isoc. 7.67; 20.11; Aeschin. 3.235; Schol. Aeschin 1.39; Arist. *Ath*. *Pol*. 35.4; see Lehman 1995: 145; Jordović 2005: 184–185; Wolpert 2006: 213–222, esp. 217–218; Shear 2011: 180–185, esp. 182.

31 In the *Ecclesiazusae* Aristophanes mentions in passing that the number of Athenian citizens is 30,000 (Ar. *Eccl*. 1131–1133). However, Mogens Hansen (1986: 27) argues that this is a conventional figure of little or no value whenever it is found. The number of citizen at the end of Peloponnesian war was, in any case, much lower than 30,000, considering that 404 is an all-time low and 31,000 is the higher figure for the number of adult male Athenian citizens in the fourth-century; see Hansen 1986: 14–69; *Id*. 2006: 20; Bleicken 1995: 546–548. Jochen Bleicken (1995: 99) says that according to a pessimistic assessment 2/3 of Athenians, who were fit for military service, died during the Peloponnesian war. It therefore follows that the number of Athenian citizens in 404 could have been around 16,000–17,000. Eberhard Ruschenbusch (1979: 145–147, esp. 146) gives the absolute lowest estimate by claiming that Athens had only 13,000 citizens at the end of the Peloponnesian war.

32 Xen. *Hell*. 2.4.21; *cf*. also Isoc. 4.113.

33 Wolpert 2002; see, e.g., Xen. *Hell*. 2.3.14–17, 21, 38–40; 47; Diod. 14.4.3–4, 32.2; Lys. 12.21–22, 30–31, 96–97.

34 See Irwin 1992: 60–61; Hitz 2010: 103–104.

That Socrates' trial represents a turning point in Plato's life is well-known. The *Apologia Socratis*, and the fact that Socrates was a key figure in almost all of Plato's dialogues are proof of a deep attachment. Xenophon explicitly points out that the prevailing opinion that Socrates had been the teacher of Alcibiades and Critias was the main reason for his indictment.[35] Even fifty years after the trial, Aeschines mentions as a well-known fact that the "sophist" Socrates was put to death because he was the teacher of the leader of the Thirty.[36] Alcibiades and Critias were responsible for the greatest man-made catastrophes of the Peloponnesian war era. The former was a driving force behind Athens greatest military defeat (the Sicilian expedition), the Spartan occupation of Deceleia and the first overthrow of democracy (the Four Hundred).[37] The latter was the leader of the most heinous regime in Athens history – the Thirty Tyrants.[38] This implies that Socrates, at least in the eyes of some Athenians, was partially responsible for their defeat and the dreadful wave of terror to which they fell victim.

The root cause of Athens' downfall was a current and important question in the fourth-century. The best-known answer is provided by Thucydides in his Obituary for Pericles. According to the historian, the main culprits for the defeat of Athens were the politicians who succeeded Pericles. Their immense, self-serving ambition meant they were so at odds with one another that they did not lead the demos, but surrendered the leadership to its whims. Personal intrigues after Sicily led to the first internal strife. Nonetheless, Athens' power was so great that for many years it withstood its numerous enemies. The Athenians did finally succumb, when they again became victim of their own private quarrels. Thus, Athens' downfall was not the result of the strength of her enemies or a systemic defect of democracy, but of the internal discord induced by egotistical and power-hungry politicians.[39] Lysias, Aeschines and even Plato confirm that this was indeed a widely-held belief among the Athenians.[40] Since Alcibiades and Critias were the two most notorious politicians, this sort of answer certainly did not help to exempt Socrates. Plato's answer was, as will be shown, diametrically opposed: democratic ideology was to blame for the emergence of individuals who thought only in categories of power and Socrates could not have done anything about it.

It is often said of Plato that his perception of the nature of democracy is marked by prejudice and a philosophical approach to the extent that his interpre-

35 Xen. *Mem*. 1.2.12–47; see also Pl. *Ap*. 19c–d, 32c–d, 33a–b; Diog. Laert. 2.38–39.

36 Aeschin. 1.173.

37 Thuc. 2.65.11–12; 6.19, 88.10, 91.6, 93.1–2, 103.2–4, 104; 7.2, 18.1 (Deceleia), 7.87.5–8.1 (Sicily); 8.48.1–4 (the Four Hundred).

38 See Jordović 2005: 169–225.

39 Thuc. 2.65.7, 10–13; see Bleckmann 1998: 318–333.

40 Lys. 2.63–65; Aeschin. 2.176; Pl. *Menex*. 243d; Isoc. 20.10–11; see also Ar. *Eq*. 180–222, 1111–1150, 1321, 1339–1354; Lys. 12.40; 25.21–22, 25–28; Isoc. 4.75–79; 18.45–46; Arist. *Ath. Pol*. 28, esp. 28.1; *cf*. Rhodes 1981: 344–345; Bleckmann 1998: 324; Schofield 2000: 198–199; Wolpert 2002: 121–123.

tation of historical facts and political reality is far too free.[41] Doubtless Plato did not care much about the specific structures of any particular political system. The focus of his attention was the effect of a political order and the influence of its predominant values on the moral and psychological conditions in the state,[42] although here too he has been criticised for not taking sufficient account of reality.[43] Such objections are certainly not groundless, but one of the main aims of the present study is to show that, while conceiving and writing his theory on the origins of tyrannical man, Plato had a clear perception of the development of Athenian democratic ideology and that this affected his condemnation of democracy to a far greater degree than is generally imagined.[44] A further objective is to demonstrate that Plato drew on democratic political theory and practice not only in criticising democracy, but also in advancing his own political theory. In the light of this and my own background, this study will focus on the structure and development of some of Plato's concepts and their relationship to the historical context. In other words, this investigation attempts to fuse intellectual history, conceptual history and classical philosophy.[45]

In his fascinating analysis Kurt Raaflaub has shown that freedom became a political virtue only after the Persian wars.[46] The conceptualisation of political freedom (both internal and external) was the result of Greek experience with the tyrants, the new isonomic constitution, renewed factionalism among the aristocracy and, most importantly, the threat of "enslavement" under the yoke of the Great King.[47] After 478, the uniqueness of Athenian *archē* was the catalyst for the evolution of the terminology of freedom.[48] It reached its maturity during the middle and later years of the fifth century, when the Athenian naval alliance revealed its true nature. Freedom and its opposite became progressively important factors in interstate debates and negotiations. As a result, an increasingly differentiated terminology of freedom, domination and servitude emerged. The

41 See, e.g., Ostwald 1986: 244; Vidal-Naquet 1995: 33; Frede 1997: 253, 258–265; Dalfen 2004: 109; Kersting [2]2006: 266–268; Scott 2008: 375; *cf.* also Annas 1981: 302–305, esp. 304; Popper [7]1992: 52; Yunis 1996: 136–145; Morgan, 2003: 199–200; *contra* Monoson 2000: 113–153; see also Anders Sørensen's (2016) careful analysis of Plato's assessment of democracy's epistemic potential.

42 Pl. *Rep.* 368c–369a, 544d–e; 545b; 548d; see Frede 1996: 260–261; *Id*. 1997: 258–259. Kurt Raaflaub (1992: 50–59) has shown that ethical aspects were an integral part of political thought in the late fifth-century.

43 See Frede 1996: 260-266; *Id*. 1997: 261–265.

44 Sara Monoson (2000: 113–114) notes: "Plato's depiction of democracy as exquisitely vulnerable to collapse into tyranny does not explain the dynamics of Athenian history, nor does it address the variety of changes that have occurred in actual regimes. Aristotle complains about this feature of *Republic* 8, pointing out that the history of Greek cities shows that regimes change form in all directions and for reasons more diverse that Plato has Socrates speak of in *Republic* 8 (*Politics* 1316a1–b30)."

45 *Cf*. Vidal-Naquet 1995: 21; Ober 1994b: 154–157; Raaflaub 2004: 5–9; Schofield 2006: 4–5.

46 See Raaflaub 2004: 23–57.

47 See Raaflaub 2004: 45–117.

48 See Raaflaub 2004: 118–128.