I. The Politics of Elitism
The Roman Republic – then and now

(P)olitical history is no longer the backbone
of history but its nucleus.
(Le Goff 1971, 13)

1. The Old Orthodoxy

In the first half of last century, the view on politics and 'the political', the political order and social structure of the Roman republic was strongly influenced by a particular interaction between German and other continental European scholars on the one hand and English and American classicists on the other. In spite of language barriers, this interaction has been particularly intensive in the international scholarly community working on this field ever since MATTHIAS GELZER and FRIEDRICH MÜNZER published their classic books on the Roman nobility and on the aristocratic parties and families in 1912 and 1920 respectively. It is by no means accidental that both books were among the few German works translated into English – if only rather belatedly, namely in 1969 and in 1999.[1] It was as late as 1986, more than half a century after publication, that a prominent Anglophone scholar, namely RONALD RIDLEY, hailed GELZER's *Nobilität* as a decisive "turning-point" – however, for him it was MÜNZER's "masterwork" which was "the most important book ever written on Roman politics".[2] The long history of this international and transcontinental scholarly interaction, with an 'elitist' concept of politics as focus, indeed remains to be of prime importance to the present day, because it has implicitly and even explicitly been referred to in the modern debate on the 'political culture' of the Republic, which began in the 1980ies and is still going on.[3]

1 GELZER 1912/1962/1969; MÜNZER 1920/1963 and 1999.
2 RIDLEY 1986, 475; see below, chapter II.
3 HÖLKESKAMP 2012/2017; 2017a; 2019b and forthcoming; JEHNE 1995a; 2006, 14–23; ZECCHINI 2006; DAVID 2006a; YAKOBSON 2006a and 2010; HURLET 2012a and 2014. Cf. on the state of the debate on elites in the ancient world in a comparative perspective the contributions in BECK/

The career of the concept 'political culture' began in 1990, when WILLIAM HARRIS chose it in his rejoinder to JOHN NORTH's critical review of the "frozen-waste theory" of politics[4] in Republican Rome in the style of GELZER's concept of 'faction', 'coterie', *clientela* etc. and MÜNZER's "aristocratic parties" and their thinly veiled "*arcana imperii*"[5] – however, without exploring the theoretical and methodological issues implied in this concept. I shall come back to the innovative potential of the 'political culture' paradigm.

Moreover, the ironical label "frozen-waste theory" was also meant to denounce SIR RONALD SYME's concept of politics as a never-ending "strife for power, wealth and glory" (in SYME's own inimitable style of writing) within the exclusive circles of "an aristocracy unique in duration and predominance". This sombre vision of the decline and fall of the *libera res publica*, which turned out to be of long-term influence on scholarship, was elegantly expounded in his influential masterpiece *The Roman Revolution*, published in September 1939 – just a few days after Great Britain had declared war on the Third Reich.[6]

SYME not only acknowledged his debt to "GELZER's lucid explanation of the character of Roman society and Roman politics, namely a nexus of personal obligations" in a footnote. In his introduction, he also made clear that his "conception of the nature of Roman politics" owed much "to the supreme example and guidance of MÜNZER"[7] – the recognized and (rightly) revered doyen of Republican prosopography, author of no less than five thousand valuable prosopographical articles in the *Realencyclopädie*, who was to perish in the Nazi concentration camp of Theresienstadt in 1942.[8] Others were luckier – such as young ERNST BADIAN. In 1938, the latter emigrated with his family to New Zealand – he was to become the pupil of the other New Zealander in Oxford, namely SYME. BADIAN went on to become, as John Moors Cabot Professor of History in Harvard, one of the most influential historians of Republican Rome in the 20th century. In a similar vein as his teacher, BADIAN explicitly singled out SYME as well as GELZER and MÜNZER, "who revolutionized the approach to the study" of the late Republic, in the preface to his first great book, *Foreign Clientelae*, published in 1958.[9]

As a consequence, during the 1950ies and much of the 1960ies, the underlying concept of Republican politics was still based on the very same concomitant set of interde-

SCHOLZ/WALTER (Eds.) 2008 and now STEIN-HÖLKESKAMP/HÖLKESKAMP 2018, with further references. The (as such) interesting contribution on the "trouble with 'aristocracy'" as concept and category shirks this debate: VAN WEES/FISHER 2015.

4 HARRIS 1990; NORTH 1990 and 1990/2004.

5 MÜNZER 1920/1963, 133; 317, cf. 427–428 = MÜNZER 1999, 127; 291, cf. 362–363; cf. below, chapter II.

6 SYME 1939/1967, 11; 405 and passim.

7 SYME 1939/1967, 10 n. 2, viii. Cf. MORSTEIN-MARX 2009a, 105–7.

8 Cf. on MÜNZER's (and GELZER's) impact on modern historiography on the Roman republic HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010, chapter 1; IDEM 2012/2017 and below, chapter II.

9 BADIAN 1958/1984, vii.

pendent assumptions: Political life was not characterized, once again in SYME's words, "by the ostensible opposition between senate and people, *optimates* and *populares*, *nobiles* and *homines novi*", let alone "by parties and programmes of a modern and parliamentary character". Rather, politics was conceived as a zero-sum game between a small number of dominant families striving for power in the shape of the consulship – that is, "the supreme magistracy", regarded by "the narrow ring" of *nobiles* as an oligarchy within the senatorial oligarchy, "as the prerogative of birth and the prize of ambition". In order to achieve this one and only objective, the leading figures – "in any age of Republican history", never more than "twenty or thirty men" – formed alliances on the basis of purely personal relations, kinship, dynastic marriages and 'friendships'. Therefore, it has to be the "composition" of this "oligarchy of government" which "emerges as the dominant theme of political history".[10] By the mid-Republic, according to HOWARD SCULLARD's similarly influential *Roman Politics 220–150 BC*, first published in 1951 and republished in 1973, these alliances or even this downright "elaborate system of groupings and counter-groupings" indeed "formed the real, if unadvertised and unofficial, basis of Roman public life". They were taken to be stable over generations, they rose to take over "government", when others fell from "power" only to rise again – a never-ending wheel of fortune.[11] It had once again been SYME who formulated the underlying axioms with an almost cynical clarity – obviously alluding to the famous dictum attributed to Caesar: "the *res publica* is nothing, a mere name without body or form".[12] In a deliberately similar vein, SYME ruled that the "Roman Commonwealth", the *res publica populi Romani*, was not only just a "name", but the "constitution" of the Republic was indeed nothing but a "façade", "a screen and a sham".[13]

Decades later, in 1986 and in papers posthumously published in 1991, SYME still imperturbably defended his radically elitist view as a metahistorical, indeed eternal truth: "In all ages, whatever the form and name of government" or "whatever may be the name and theory of the constitution", "be it monarchy, republic, or democracy, an oligarchy lurks behind the façade". In his typically magisterial – or should I say: 'imperious' – tone, SYME declared the whole of Roman history, "Republican or Imperial", to be "the history of the governing class". It was this "oligarchy of government" and its "composition", the machinations of the "parties" or "factions" in their midst and the typical "weapons" which their noble leaders wielded in their "lust of power" and "domination" which remained the "dominant theme of political history, as the binding link between the Republic and the Empire". On the receiving end, as it were, the amorphous and anonymous "other classes" were at best "susceptible to *auctoritas*, taking

10 SYME 1939/1967, 10–11; 18 and vii.
11 SCULLARD 1951/1973, passim, and IDEM (1935) 1980, 333 (quotation).
12 Suet. Iul. 77.
13 SYME 1939/1967, 15; 340.

their tone and tastes from above". In fact, the "lower classes" of the people, in his words, not only "had no voice in government", but even had no "place in history" – they were just "mice", who "must simply accept their place in the great scheme of things".[14]

2. The New Radicalism

By then, however, the winds of change had already gained momentum. It was SIR FERGUS MILLAR who not only rejected this apparently well-established orthodoxy – and who eventually admitted, if only years later, that it was his teacher RONALD SYME who had been its most influential representative.[15] MILLAR also offered a new, indeed iconoclastic reading of the "political character" of the Republic as a whole – although he never systematically explained his analytical categories: MILLAR claimed that the *libera res publica* was to be conceived as a variant of ancient democracy, which was much more akin to the direct democracy of classical Athens than modern (once again especially German) scholarship had been prepared to admit. In obvious contrast to SYME, MILLAR not only held that it was the *populus Romanus*, "as represented by the various forms of assembly", which was "in a formal sense the sovereign body in the Republican constitution". He even suggested that it was therefore only fit and proper, and indeed high time, that the Roman people be restored "to their proper place in the history of democratic values" and the Republic be counted among the "relatively small group of historical examples of political systems" that "might deserve the label 'democracy'".[16]

MILLAR even explicitly questioned whether there ever was "a 'governing class', an 'aristocracy', or an 'élite'". Candidates for public office – even if they were of *nobilis* status – had to run as individuals. The term *nobilis* was only "social or political, not constitutional", and a man called *nobilis* did not enjoy anything like the hereditary constitutional rights of an English peer. In fact, however, nobody – not even THEODOR MOMMSEN, GELZER and MÜNZER – had ever dreamt of claiming as much. As a consequence, MILLAR flatly denied the existence of any homogeneous ruling class. To put it in a nutshell, for MILLAR neither an aristocracy nor an oligarchy ever existed in the Republic.[17]

Paradoxically enough, the new elitist bête noire was now CHRISTIAN MEIER, even though the latter had been the first scholar to offer a comprehensive and systematic de-

14 SYME 1939/1967, vii; 7; 18; 346; 459; 476; MACMULLEN 1988, 106 (quotations), with the comment of HAMMER 2009, 24–25. SYME restated his view decades later: e. g. SYME 1986a, v; 13; cf. also SYME 1986b/1991 and 1988/1991. Cf. also his posthumously published papers on important families and figures of the late Republic: SYME 2016.

15 Author's Prologue, in: MILLAR 2002, 12–13.

16 MILLAR 1984/2002, 112; 1986/2002, 158; 1989/2002; 1995/2002, 165; 1995a/2002; 1998, 4; 11; 208 (quotations); cf. also MILLAR 2002a, 6. Cf. also LINTOTT 1987.

17 MILLAR 1984/2002, 126–127; 1989/2002, 87; 90–92; 104–106; 2002, 4–6.

construction of the received 'factionalist' wisdom and a completely new concept of the Republican "political grammar" in his book *Res publica amissa*, first published in 1966; it was re-issued in 1980, with an important theoretical and methodological introduction, which focussed on innovative perspectives such as a general theory of political group formation in pre-modern societies.[18] These important contributions have not received the attention which they deserve – this time due to the language barrier. In contrast to his famous biography of Caesar,[19] MEIER's first masterpiece has never been translated into English – moreover, despite its obvious influence on much of modern research in any language, interestingly enough, the book is quite often not even quoted itself, but only, as it were, indirectly: quite a few serious Anglophone scholars just refer to the series of reviews in English, above all the detailed discussion in the influential review by PETER BRUNT.[20]

3. The New Radicalism Criticized

Back to the 1980s and 1990s. MILLAR's conception of the Republic as a "direct democracy" on the "strictly and purely formal" basis of a "constitution" soon met with criticism – not least from German scholars, who not only took issue with MILLAR's view of a Roman "constitution" in the narrow sense of the concept, which he defined as a kind of "structure", "system" or even "complex machinery" of institutions and procedures[21] – a concept which seemed to owe too much to MOMMSEN's *Römisches Staatsrecht*.[22] Above all, MILLAR's continental critics insisted on the continued importance of a basically oligarchic political class – a class or rather status group with a remarkable rate of reproduction, given the fact that in the middle Republic it had never been a completely closed caste: from the mid-third century onwards, the number of consuls with consular ancestors never dropped below 70 % and eventually rose to more than 80 % in the last generation of the Republic.[23]

However, MILLAR was certainly right in stating that even "a person who was both a *patricius* and a *nobilis* had to compete for office"[24] – and his critics adopted this insight. Their reformed 'elitist' concept of the Republican political culture is based on the view that the role of popular assemblies and of SYME's "other classes" needs indeed to be taken seriously – namely as a crucial factor in the constitution and reproduction of a

18 MEIER 1966/1980; cf. also recently MEIER 2015.
19 MEIER 1982/1995 (and several reprints).
20 JRS 58, 1968, 229–32.
21 MILLAR 1995/2002, 165; 172; MILLAR 2002, 15; 99; 208.
22 JEHNE 1995a, 8; HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010, chapter 2, and IDEM 2005/2017, 34–35, with further references.
23 BADIAN 1990, 411–12 and passim; cf. also HOPKINS/BURTON 1983, 32; 112; 117 and table 2.4 (p. 58).
24 MILLAR 1998, 4.

particular variant of a ruling class. If reputation, relative rank and indeed membership in this elite as such was regularly and exclusively based on (election to) certain offices, the institutionalized participation of assemblies cannot be dismissed as merely formal, passive, powerless or nominal or as a charade or façade.

Moreover, MILLAR had raised important issues which went far beyond his own narrow and formalistic conception of the political system and which have been central themes of an ongoing and lively international debate ever since.[25] Above all, he had insisted on the overwhelming importance of mass oratory, the central role and function of the orator before the people assembled in the Comitium or Forum and the particular kind of publicity of politics in general and of decision-making processes in particular. Interestingly enough, it was this specific form of direct communication and interaction on the one hand, and recently also the 'public opinion' of non-elite groups as addressees on the other, that became themes of the debate on the political culture, which had begun with the exchange between WILLIAM HARRIS and JOHN NORTH, mentioned above. Before I return to the concrete, empirical topics of the debate, it seems necessary to look at the theoretical foundations of the 'political-culture paradigm'.

4. 'Political Culture' as Paradigm

The career of the concept 'political culture' had begun considerably earlier and in a completely different scientific context. The general intellectual background of this career received inspirations from two rather different sides (independently of each other, but to a certain extent converging in the process). On the one hand, there was the introduction of the term in political science by GABRIEL ALMOND, SIDNEY VERBA, LUCIAN PYE, LOWELL DITTMER and others since the late 1950s and early 1960s – their conception of 'political cultures' of contemporary societies was focused on subjective attitudes, knowledge, opinions and beliefs, i. e. cognitive, affective and evaluative orientations toward politics, policies, and political action.[26] Interestingly enough, if only as a side-glance, a cursory look at the type of the "secularized city-state", characterized by "limited differentiation", but also by "relatively complex social structures"

25 Detailed reviews of the ongoing debate, which are contributions to it in their own right, include NORTH 1990/2004; MOURITSEN 2001, 3–17; JEHNE 1995a and 2006, 12–24 and passim; BENOIST 2004; WARD 2004; MORSTEIN-MARX 2004, 5–12 and passim; IDEM 2009a, 107–10; HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010, chapters 6–8; MARCONE 2005; CONNOLLY 2007, 30–38; TATUM 2009; HURLET 2012a and 2014; CLEMENTE 2017 and 2018; PINA POLO 2019a, 380–83 and passim; HÖLKESKAMP 2019b, all with further references.

26 PYE/VERBA (Eds.) 1965 (especially the Introduction by PYE and the Conclusion by VERBA); ALMOND/POWELL 1966; PYE 1968; DITTMER 1977. Cf. ALMOND/VERBA 1963; CHILTON 1988; ROHE 1990; FUCHS 2007 and SCHUPPERT 2008 (esp. chapters 1 and 3), both with ample bibliography.

such as "the Greek city-states, republican Rome, and some of the city-states of medieval Europe", was included in their systematic outline of 'political culture(s)' as a disciplinary category and new matrix. As the "city-state as a political form is now primarily of historical interest", however, "there would be little purpose in exploring the various categories which might be employed to order the examples of this type". However, against the backdrop of the vibrant debate on Roman politics, mentioned above, this "historical interest" has gained a new lease of life – and by no means only for ancient historians.[27]

On the other hand, there were the debates on the 'linguistic' and 'cultural turns' and their impact on modern historiography on medieval as well as on (early) modern history, followed by a series of other turns (or perhaps rather 'sub-turns' under the umbrella of the universal 'cultural turn'), namely the 'spatial', 'performative', 'pictorial/iconic' and 'communicative turns'.[28] In the view of the advocates of a new cultural history of politics, it is to be seen as an interactive process of communication between different parties involved, that is between elites and 'ordinary' members of a given political community as addressees. This process of discursive negotiating includes not only concrete decisions on politics and policies, but also the general rules governing the procedures of decision-making and the wielding of 'power' in general, the acceptance of these rules as well as the legitimacy of the decision-makers, their recruitment, status and claims, their public performance and 'self-fashioning'.[29]

It is against this general backdrop that I want to suggest a concept of 'political culture', based on modern (social and cultural) history as well as on political science. Such a strategy could provide a strong link between the various perspectives and methodological approaches, ideas and interpretations and finally place them in a new, differentiated and complex context. The nodal point here are the two fundamental sides of politics, political systems and the 'political' as such: On the one hand, there is the traditional side of politics, that is, as it were, the 'content' or 'matter' of politics and policies, which includes not only the concrete themes and topics on the political agenda of a given society, but also the 'technical' framework of institutions and formal procedures

27 ALMOND/POWELL 1966, 256–58. Cf. however BURKE 1986 and the Editors' Preface in: MOLHO/RAAFLAUB/EMLEN (Eds.) 9–17; SCHEIDEL 2013, 30–32, and the monumental collections on city-states and "city-state cultures": MOLHO/RAAFLAUB/EMLEN (Eds.) 1991, HANSEN (Ed.) 2000 and 2002, and the relevant contributions in BANG/SCHEIDEL (Eds.) 2013; PARKER 2004. Cf. the influential studies on Italian city-states, such as BRUCKER 1977, TREXLER 1980, MUIR 1981 and LANDWEHR 2007, and modern comparative research on early modern German 'city(states)', such as KRISCHER 2006; GOPPOLD 2007 and SCHILLING 2012. Cf. HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010, 71–75; 129–30, with further references.

28 Cf. the brilliant introduction by BACHMANN-MEDICK 2016, especially chapters II, VI and VII; HÖLKESKAMP 2015 and 2019b.

29 Cf. HAMMER 2009, 32–34 on "politics as cultural performance". Cf. on the theoretical foundation and methodological approach of 'politics as communication' FREVERT 2005, 14–21; GOPPOLD 2007, chapter II and passim; HÖLKESKAMP 2017a, 461–62, with further references.

of rational decision-making. On the other hand, this concept necessarily includes, and to a certain extent focuses on, the symbolic dimensions of politics and power, their 'expressive' side of 'representation' or 'manifestation', which in turn includes not only the media, symbols, visual and other symbolic 'languages' and discursive strategies, but also the collective repertoire of values, attitudes and 'mentalities' of a given society, which are shaped, critized, modified or otherwise negotiated in and through these 'languages' and strategies.[30]

By this dual category, I should like to understand, on the one hand, the conceptual system of social values and views of the world, of self and other, of mutual and shared expectations of behaviour in public roles and of the semantics of politics in general that underlie the surface of power and interests, politics and political decision-making. We are dealing here with a system of moral concepts and their corresponding terms as well as with a number of generally accepted convictions about the conventions and customs of a political order.

The important point of departure for further enquiries is that this level of collective ethical and cognitive dispositions always, in every 'political culture', strongly influences, determines or even controls the 'public' view of politics and policies as well as the 'politicizability' of concrete topics, social problems and political challenges. This neologism is meant to conceptualize the capacity of a system to make such problems the explicit subject-matter of public debate and discursive controversy as well as to put them on the agenda of deliberation and decision-making in political institutions. This approach necessarily includes the question of the limits of this capacity, which can be expected to vary considerably in different political cultures and therefore need to be looked at in their own right. These dispositions of a given society also invariably condition the socially accepted general requirements for obtaining and holding positions of power and political leadership. In addition, these dispositions inform the rules that govern the recruitment of individuals into these positions and frame the hopes and expectations which a given society at large and relevant groups place in the holders of leadership functions, in their abilities and qualities, individually as well as collectively, that is, in their class as a whole. Vice versa, these dispositions determine the fulfilment of such expectations by political leaders, the usual roles and patterns of behaviour, the (re-)construction of their public 'personae', their individual and collective self-image and self-understanding as well as the means and media of presenting and profiling

30 Cf. for modern discussions of the concept 'political culture', its meaning and epistemological status as a descriptive and/or analytical category in (early modern and ancient) history e. g. HUNT 1984, 10–16; cf. also SHARPE 1999, 853–54; BRADDICK 2005, 79–71; 81–82 and passim; BRADDICK/WALTER 2001; HÖLKESKAMP 2009, 36–49; IDEM 2004/2010, 53–57, and IDEM 2014a, 363–67, with further references. Cf. on the dimensions of a "new political history" already LE GOFF 1971 and the surveys by FREVERT 2005, HAUPT 2005 and SCHORN-SCHÜTTE 2006, on discourse analysis LANDWEHR 2008, on politics as a "cultural phenomenon, embedded in society" OBER 1989, 35–42, and on "culture-based approaches" to Roman history in general now ROLLER 2010.

themselves – that is, in short, the complex 'dramaturgy' of political action and public appearance in general. It thus affects all media, forms and levels of social interaction and communication, once again individually as well as collectively, inside the political class itself, that is, between *nobiles* and 'ordinary' senators, but also between magistrates and citizens, patrons and clients, as well as between the ruling class and the (notoriously elusive) 'man in the Roman street',[31] the *populus Romanus* or the *plebs* at large.

To put it in yet another way, a 'political culture' has by definition more than just one side: on the one hand, there is the 'technical' or rational side of politics, as it were, its 'surface' of concrete agenda, explicit 'content' and 'matter'. On the other hand, there is an 'expressive', a 'ceremonial' and a corresponding cognitive side. In concrete terms, this means that politics has symbolic, affective and aesthetic dimensions which together underwrite, permanently reproduce and renew, the legitimacy of the political system on the 'surface' and ensure its acceptance by assuring its 'meaning' and 'sense'.[32] It also confirms affiliations, generates compliance, constitutes and maintains a collective 'identity' of a group – and this is a fundamental function of 'political culture' understood as a "language of legitimation": this language comprises, on the one hand, "a vocabulary of images, metaphors, rituals, assumptions and performances", through which "political negotiations are conducted", as well as, on the other hand, "a grammar, a set of conventions, governing the appropriate use of this vocabulary" – a definition which seems to tie in quite nicely with CHRISTIAN MEIER'S concept of the 'political grammar' of late republican Rome.[33] In this sense, political culture "constitutes the discursive environment in which power is legitimated" – and more than that: this 'language' serves the discursive construction of order, hierarchy and subordination and is therefore instrumental not only in *representing* power, but also in *stabilizing* and even *generating* it: "Political symbols and rituals were not metaphors of power; they were the means and ends of power itself".[34]

Therefore, I suggest to take the concept, firstly, to include the "symbolic dimensions of social action"[35] in the 'public' sphere of politics and the concomitant communicative system of symbols, images and their semantics, shared (or at least understood) by the political community at large. Above all, secondly, a holistic model of a 'political culture'

31 Cf. now HARTNETT 2017 on "urban life" in the "Roman street".

32 Cf. ROHE 1990; STOLLBERG-RILINGER 2000, 2001, 2004 and 2005.

33 Cf. HÖLKESKAMP 2009/2017, 322–23, on MEIER 1966/1980, chapter IV, and passim.

34 Quotations: BRADDICK 2005, 69 and HUNT 1984, 54. HURLET 2014 similarly defines "culture politique" … "comme un langage de légitimation contenant à la fois un vocabulaire d'images, des métaphores, des rituels et des actes performatifs à travers lesquels les négociations politiques étaient menées". Cf. also now DENCH 2018, 32, who unfortunately, in spite of the title of her interesting book, does not offer a systematic definition of "political culture(s)". Cf. also GOPPOLD 2007, 22–39 and passim; SCHILLING 2012, chapter 1, and on the 'politics of ritual' in modern research the general contributions in MARTSCHUKAT/PATZOLD (Eds.) 2003 and STOLLBERG-RILINGER 2013.

35 GEERTZ 1973, 30.

in general (that is, pre-modern or modern, historical or contemporary) must highlight the specific interfaces and interconnections of these formal and social, ideological and symbolic dimensions, as well as their complex cross-referencing.[36] A modern 'cultural history of politics' could certainly derive further profit from other modern models of middle-range explanatory reach, which focus on these interdependencies. These include a systems-theoretical model of 'institutionality' which conceives 'institutions' in terms of diachronic processes of acting out functions and their change as well as in terms of 'habitualization' and 'structuration', ritualization, formalization and, ultimately, 'institutionalization'.[37] Such a model should be able not only to describe functions and offices of any polity and its particular degree of institutional consolidation, but also explain the negotiation, emergence (or demise) and implementation of rules and norms, written and unwritten, and also of procedures and practices, formalized or informal.

5. The Proof of the Pudding …

To come back to the Roman republic in recent research: the debate mentioned above not only continues to the present day, but has also long gone way beyond the less than fruitful question, whether or not we should conceptualize the Republic as a (sort of) democracy[38] – in spite of occasional attempts to resuscitate MILLAR's radical reading of the "character" of the Roman republic.[39] At any rate, the continuing flow of contributions by scholars from Europe (including Great Britain), Israel, the United States and

36 CONNOLLY 2015, 205–6, has misunderstood and misrepresented my model of a complex combination of dimensions proposed in HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010: I certainly did not "undercut (…) the radical critical gesture" made by my own "analysis of the limitations of conventional historiography" by "dismiss(ing) the symbolic, the affective, and the aesthetic elements of politics as somehow not 'actual' politics" – let alone did I "end(…) up seeing the republic through the superimposed frame of modern constitutionalism and institutionalism".

37 BERGER/LUCKMANN 1966, chapter 2; GIDDENS 1984, chapter 6. Cf. BRADDICK 2005, 88; HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010, 67–70, with references. Cf. on (political as well as social) "structures" and "institutional power" BECK 2009b, 501–6.

38 Cf. the surveys of the debate JEHNE 1995a and 2006; HURLET 2012a; CLEMENTE 2017 and 2018; PINA POLO 2019a. See also FLAIG 1994; GRUEN 1991, 1996 and 2017. Cf. for surveys of modern approaches to the social and political history of the Republic the other contributions in ROSENSTEIN/MORSTEIN-MARX (Eds.) 2006, HAAKE/HARDERS (Eds.) 2017 as well as HÖLKESKAMP, 2019b and IDEM, forthcoming, all with further references. Cf. on comparative approaches to Greek city-states and the Roman republic the pioneering book by FINLEY 1983 (with the evaluation by HARRIS 2013) and the contributions in MOLHO/RAAFLAUB/EMLEN (Eds.) 1991; BECK 2009b. Cf. for systematic reflections and approaches KONSTAN 2015, HAMMER 2015 and the other contributions in HAMMER (Ed.) 2015.

39 MILLAR 1984/2002; cf. WISEMAN 2009, 1; 2002/2009, 31–32; IDEM 2017, 16–17; 33 and passim, whose polemic commentary on my approach in HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010 fails to address the central issue.

Canada attests to the vibrant liveliness and truly international character of the debate. In concrete terms, the new and radically reformed 'elitist' view outlined above has focussed in recent years on a wide spectrum of hitherto neglected or even new fields of research and concrete topics:

– the institutions such as the magistracies,[40] the senate[41] and the assemblies,[42] their complex interaction and the formal procedures of deliberation, making and implementation of decisions;[43] this needs to go way beyond the 'constutionalist' paradigm in the *Staatsrecht* tradition, mentioned above, and must avoid what MOSES FINLEY had described as the "constitutional-law trap;"[44]
– the emergence of the social and political order during the so-called 'struggle of the orders'; this was a highly complex process, in which internal social, economic and cultural factors and external developments, namely permanent defensive and later offensive military action and territorial expansion, were closely intertwined;[45]

40 Recent analyses of the Republican magistracies include LINTOTT 1999, chapter VII and VIII; BRENNAN 2014 and WALTER 2017, 25–50; 154–83. Cf. BECK 2005 on the *cursus honorum*; BERTHELET 2015 on *potestas*, *auspicia*, *auctoritas* etc.; PINA POLO 2011a and the contributions in BECK/DUPLÁ/JEHNE/PINA POLO (Eds.) 2011 on the consulship; BRENNAN 2000 on the praetorship; BECKER 2017 on the aediles; BLEICKEN 1955/1968 and 1981/1988; HÖLKESKAMP 1987/2011, chapters III and IV, IDEM 1988/2004 and 1990/2004; THOMMEN 1989 and recently LANFRANCHI 2015 and RUSSELL 2015 on the tribunate of the *plebs*; CLEMENTE 2016 on the censorship; PINA POLO / DÍAZ FERNÁNDEZ 2019 on the quaestorship; LINTOTT 1999, chapter VIII on "minor magistrates".

41 Cf. BONNEFOND-COUDRY 1989 and (rather extravagant) RYAN 1998 (cf. the review by E. FLAIG, in: Gnomon 76, 2004, 331–41); LINTOTT 1999, chapter VI; HÖLKESKAMP 2005/2017, 37–41; JEHNE 2013b; WALTER 2017, 183–88, 50–54, and now TIMMER 2020, all with references.

42 NICOLET 1980, chapter VII; LINTOTT 1999, chapter V; MOURITSEN 2001, chapters 4 and 5 and IDEM 2017, chapters 1 and 2; JEHNE 2013a, 2014 and 2017; WALTER 2017, 58–69; 188–207.

43 Cf. on the "balance of the constitution" LINTOTT 1999, chapter XI; see also MOURITSEN 2013, 384–90, and IDEM 2015, 150–54; TATUM 2015; PINA POLO 2016; WALTER 2017, chapters I.4 and II.4. See also the relevant contributions in ITGENSHORST/LE DOZE (Eds.) 2017, and now the brilliant description of the republican political order as a "non-formalized system of negotiation" by TIMMER 2017, chapter 2.1.

44 FINLEY 1983, 56. Cf. on MOMMSEN's concept of magistracy, senate and assemblies as a continuing challenge to research LINTOTT 2005, HÖLKESKAMP 2005/2017 and JEHNE 2005 as well as the general survey by NIPPEL 2005.

45 Recent surveys include CAH² VII 2; CORNELL 1995; FORSYTHE 2005; RAAFLAUB 2006, 135–43; MOURITSEN 2013, 393–406; WALTER 2014a, 100–5; FRONDA 2015; HUMM 2018 and 2018a, all with ample bibliography. Cf. on particular aspects the contributions in RAAFLAUB (Ed.) 1986/2005 and in EDER (ed.) 1990; SMITH 2006 (on the *gens* and social organisation); HÖLKESKAMP 1987/2011, 1988/2004 and 1993/2004 (on the emergence of the new ruling class); STEWART 1998 and SMITH 2011 (on magistrates and "public office"); LANFRANCHI 2015 (on the tribunate of the *plebs* "et la formation de la République romaine"); HUMM 2005 (on Ap. Claudius Caecus in context); HARRIS 1979 and recently ARMSTRONG 2016 (on "war and society").

– the emergence and development of hegemony over the Italian peoples and cities, its political, socio-economic and cultural repercussions and the vexed question of the degree of integration and 'Romanization' of the so-called *socii*;[46]
– the enormous influx of resources in the wake of 'imperial' expansion and its economic, social and cultural ramifications;[47]
– the character, construction and reproduction of 'power' in general and the concept of "politics as inscribed relations of power";[48]
– the character of the *res publica* as 'state' or, more precisely, its particular degree of 'stateness' and 'city-statehood';[49]
– the meaning, contents and complex relationship of *mos* (*maiorum*), *ius* and *lex*, of norms and rules, general principles, 'constitutional conventions' and formal legislation – including the vexed problem of their flexibility and its limits;[50]
– the character of competition and the complex complementarity of competition and consensus[51], which necessitated the development of informal rules governing

46 Cf. ROTH 2007, chapter 1; HÖLKESKAMP 1987/2011, 1993/2004 and 2007 and now ARMSTRONG 2016; TERRENATO 2019. See the contributions in KEAY/TERRENATO (Eds.) 2001, JEHNE/PFEILSCHIFTER (Eds.) 2006, ROSELAAR (Ed.) 2012; EVANS (Ed.) 2013, JEHNE/LINKE/RÜPKE (Eds.) 2013, JEHNE/PINA POLO (Eds.) 2015 and HÖLKESKAMP/KARATAŞ/ROTH (Eds.) 2019, all with further references. See also STEK 2013 and now CARLÀ-UHINK 2017.

47 Cf. the contributions in BECK/JEHNE/SERRATI (Eds.) 2016 and TAN 2017. Cf. on the repercussions of the Punic Wars ROSENSTEIN 2014.

48 Cf. HAMMER 2009, 28–32 and passim; cf. also GOTTER 2008; HARRIS 2010 and 2016, chapter 1 and passim; ROSENSTEIN 2012, 13–18, on "soft power"; BRENNAN 2014; TATUM 2015, 258–59 and passim; MOURITSEN 2015, 157–58, all with references. DENCH 2018, 33–45, offers interesting, if somehow unsystematic observations on the ways and means of "reproducing Roman power".

49 HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010, 67–75; 129–30; IDEM 2017a, 477–80, both with further references; cf. WALTER 1998 and 2014a, 105–12, and the contributions in EDER (Ed.) 1990, HANSEN (Ed.) 2000 and now LUNDGREEN 2014 and the other contributions in LUNDGREEN (Ed.) 2014.

50 BLEICKEN 1975 remains fundamental; LUNDGREEN 2011, 2014a and 2017; WALTER 2014, with further references, and the other contributions in WALTER (Ed.) 2014 and ITGENSHORST/LE DOZE (Eds.) 2017. Cf. on the concept of *mos maiorum* in general HÖLKESKAMP 1996/2004; BLÖSEL 2000; BETTINI 2000/2011; PINA POLO 2004; WALTER 2004, 55–56; 65–66 etc.; ARENA 2015, 219–25, all with further references. Cf. on definitions of these concepts HÖLKESKAMP 2019c, with further references, and PINA POLO 2019 on transgression.

51 Cf. for the concept of 'competition', its dynamics and its status as an analytical category HÖLKESKAMP 2006/2017, 2014, 2019a and b; VAN WEES 2011; DAMON/PIEPER 2019, all with further references. Cf. for competition in the Roman republic HÖLKESKAMP 1987/2011; ROSENSTEIN 1990, 1993 and 2012, 29–35; BLECKMANN 2002; STEEL 2013, 42–54; NEBELIN 2014, as well as MOURITSEN 2011 on "containing elite competition" and HÖLKESKAMP 1993/2004, 2006/2017; 2004/2010, 103–106 etc. and recently IDEM 2019a, for the complementarity of competition and consensus; NEEL 2015 offers interesting interpretations of competition in the shape of "dyadic rivalry" in Roman myth. See now TIMMER 2014 and FLOWER 2014a on 'consensus' as concept and analytical category, and TIMMER 2017, passim, on 'trust' as a social resource.

the processes of political decision-making, legislation in general and channelling the fiercely contested elections to the higher magistracies;[52]
– the 'technical' as well as symbolic functions of popular assemblies as well as other forms of ritualized integration such as the census;[53]
– the *contio* as *oratoris maxima scaena*, as forum as well as form or medium of communicative interaction and the institutional, social and cultural contexts of political oratory;[54]
– the fundamental role of the orator as a public political and social role of prominence;[55]
– the meanings, connotations and rhetorical functions of key concepts of the system of moral values in (late) Republican political discourse[56] such as *virtus*[57] and

52 BECK 2005; NEBELIN 2014, 153–58. Cf. also PINA POLO 2011a; YAKOBSON 1999 and IDEM 2017 on elections; JEHNE 1995b, NEBELIN 2014, 150–53; BECK 2016 and 2019 and KARATAŞ 2019 on legislation on *ambitus*; ROSILLO-LOPEZ 2010 on 'corruption'; BERNARD 2019 on competition and economic change.

53 NICOLET 1980, chapter II; DÖBLER 1999, chapter 1.III; JEHNE 2003, 2010, 2013a, 2014 and 2017; FLAIG 1995a and IDEM 2003, chapters 8 and 9; HOLLARD 2010; HIEBEL 2012 and 2019; MOURITSEN 2017, chapters 1 and 2; WALTER 2017, chapters I.3, II.3 and III.4, with further references.

54 PINA POLO 1989, 1996; 2011b and 2012; HÖLKESKAMP 1995/2004; FLAIG 1995a and 2017; MOURITSEN 2001, chapter 3, and IDEM 2017, chapter 2; YAKOBSON 2004 and 2018; MORSTEIN-MARX 2004; DAVID 2006; CONNOLLY 2007; ALEXANDER 2007; TATUM 2007; TAN 2008; HIEBEL 2009 and TIERSCH 2009 and 2018, 37–49; JEHNE 2011 and 2011a; ANGIUS 2018, part III 1; FROLOV 2018. Cf. also the relevant contributions in a series of important edited volumes BERRY/ERSKINE (Eds.) 2010; SMITH/COVINO (Eds.) 2011; ROSILLO-LOPEZ (Ed.) 2017; STEEL/VAN DER BLOM (Eds.) 2013; GRAY/BALBO/MARSHALL/STEEL (Eds.) 2018; VAN DER BLOM/GRAY/STEEL (Eds.) 2018 and ROSILLO-LOPEZ (Ed.) 2019.

55 JEHNE 2000c; STEEL 2006; CONNOLLY 2007, passim; DUGAN 2009; VAN DER BLOM 2010 and 2016; DAVID 2011 and 2014 and below, chapter IV, with further references. Cf. on the importance of gestures ALDRETE 1999, and on the concept of 'prominence role' HÖLKESKAMP 2011/2017.

56 MOURITSEN 2017, chapter 3; WALTER 2017, 57–58; 193–95; ROSENSTEIN 2006; TATUM 2007; SCHOFIELD 2009. HELLEGOUARC'H 1963/1972 and the contributions by LIND 1972, 1979, 1986, 1989, 1992 and 1994 as well as in BRAUN/HALTENHOFF/MUTSCHLER (Eds.) 2000, HALTENHOFF/HEIL/MUTSCHLER (Eds.) 2003 and HALTENHOFF/HEIL/MUTSCHLER (Eds.) 2005 remain fundamental. Cf. also MOORE 1989; THOME 2000, I and II passim (see, however, the critical remarks in SCHMIDT 2005, 3–4); HÖLKESKAMP 1987/2011, chapter V and 318–26; ARENA 2015; GILDENHARD 2007, 118–125; PIGNATELLI 2008; ATKINS 2018, 73–79. Cf. on the problematic tradition of the German tradition of 'Wertbegriffe' and its ideological contamination SCHMIDT 2005 and REBENICH 2005.

57 MCDONNELL 2006a and 2011; cf. also THOME 2000, I, 76–87. Cf. also GILDENHARD 2007 and 2011, s. v.; BALMACEDA 2017, 34–47 and passim.

humanitas,[58] *libertas*[59] and *fides*,[60] *pax*[61] and *concordia*,[62] *res publica* and *populus*,[63] *populares*/*optimates*,[64] *maiestas*,[65] *imperium*, *imperator* and the underlying "idéologie impératoriale"[66] as well as the concepts denoting rewards in the shape of honour, prestige, rank and reputation as well as influence: *honos*/*honores*, *gloria*, *dignitas* und *auctoritas*;[67]

– other, that is, as it were, extra-institutional forms of popular participation, including ritualized and violent forms of popular protest;[68]
– the 'public opinion' of non-elite social classes and sub-groups – such as the so-called *plebs media*[69] – including the character, contents, media and manifestations of "popular culture" and "popular memory";[70]
– the specific character of 'public life' and the politics and practices of 'publicity';[71]

58 GILDENHARD 2011, 201–16.

59 COGITORE 2011; ARENA 2012; cf. also CONNOLLY 2007, 34–35; ATKINS 2018, chapter 2. WIRSZUBSKI 1950 and BLEICKEN 1962/1998, 1972/1998 and 1976/1998 remain important, as well as RAAFLAUB 1984 and 2003a; BRUNT 1988, 281–350; 518–23, and NICOLET 1980, chapter VIII.

60 FREYBURGER 1986; HÖLKESKAMP 2000b/2004; THOME 2000, I, 74–76; II, 50–84; PIGNATELLI 2008, 35–47.

61 CORNWELL 2017.

62 AKAR 2013.

63 HODGSON 2017 (with the review by K.-J. HÖLKESKAMP, in: AJPh 139, 2018, 521–24); cf. GRILLI 2005; JEHNE 2017, 539–43 and passim; MOATTI 2017 and 2018; RUSSELL 2019. See also CONNOLLY 2015 for interesting and stimulating reading of "Roman republicanism".

64 ROBB 2010 (with the review by K.-J. HÖLKESKAMP, in: Tyche 26, 2011, 377–83); TIERSCH 2018, 35–36; 50–68; cf. also SCHETTINO 2009, 90–104, and ZECCHINI 2009b, 109–18.

65 D'ALOJA 2011.

66 See on the concept of *imperium* RICHARDSON 2008; VERVAET 2014; 2014; DROGULA 2015 (with the review by R. PFEILSCHIFTER, in: Gnomon 90, 2018, 327–33). Cf. also ASSENMAKER 2012 and 2014.

67 Cf. on different forms of 'prestige' the relevant contributions in: HURLET/RIVOAL/SIDÉRA (Eds.) 2014, and in BAUDRY/HURLET (Eds.) 2016. Cf. on *honos/honores* PIGNATELLI 2008, 85–91; PFEILSCHIFTER 2019; on *gloria* THOMAS 2002 and PIGNATELLI 2008, 65–73; on *dignitas* ibidem, 29–33; THOME 2000, I, 87–90; II, 117–34; BADEL 2005, 42–45; IDEM 2014; on *auctoritas* PIGNATELLI 2008, 21–27; THOMAS 2014; cf. HÖLKESKAMP 1987/2011, 206–13; 225–27; 322, with references, and my general remarks in HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010, 48–52.

68 NICOLET 1980, chapter IX; VANDERBROECK 1987; NIPPEL 1988, chapters II and III; IDEM 1995, chapters 2 and 3; MOURITSEN 2001; FLAIG 2003, chapters 10 and 11, and IDEM 2009; JEHNE 2013a and 2017. Cf. also YAKOBSON 2006, 2006a and 2010; STEEL 2013, chapter 2; ROSILLO-LÓPEZ 2018; ANGIUS 2018, part III 2, KNOPF 2018 and WALTER 2019.

69 ROSILLO-LOPEZ 2016, 2017 and 2017a; cf. the contributions in EADEM (Ed.) 2019; ANGIUS 2018; HURLET/MONTLAHUC 2018. Cf. on the *plebs media* now COURRIER 2014, with the review by K.-J. HÖLKESKAMP, in: Klio 100,1, 2018, 289–93.

70 Cf. HORSFALL 1996 and 2003; ALDRETE 1999, 99–164; COURRIER 2012 and 2018 and the other contributions in GRIG (Ed.) 2018; WISEMAN 2014; PINA POLO 2018a.

71 YAKOBSON 2018 and ROSILLO-LÓPEZ 2018.

– the so-called informal, seemingly purely ornamental aspects of 'political culture', namely the communicative as well as symbolic, performative and ritual dimensions of politics in general;[72]
– spectacular performances and specific 'civic rituals' in particular, such as festivals of all kinds on the one hand[73] and the *pompa funebris*, the triumph and other *pompae* on the other;[74]
– the character and contents of the collective ('social' or 'cultural') memory[75] of the *populus Romanus* and its elite, including the role of historiography in general and of *exempla* and exemplarity as a culture-specific figure of discourse in particular on the one hand[76] and of other (performative) media on the other;[77]

72 HOPKINS 1991/2018; SUMI 2005; HAMMER 2009, 32–34 on "politics as cultural performance"; DENCH 2018, 29–33, on "the language of 'spectacle', 'performance' and 'ritual'" (32). This dimension of politics includes what FLAIG 2003, chapters 5 and 6, called "zwingende Gesten" (compelling gestures); cf. now on "squalor" (demonstratively public mourning) DEGELMANN 2018.

73 Cf. SCULLARD 1981, with sources; BEARD/NORTH/PRICE 1998, I, 42–51; II, chapter 5; RÜPKE 2012 and 2012a. Cf. on (religious) festivals in general RASMUS BRANDT/IDDENG 2012 and IDDENG 2012; RÜPKE 2012, all with references. Cf. on (dramatic) festivals especially the contributions in WISEMAN 1994, 1998 and 2008.

74 NICOLET 1980, 346–56; FLOWER 2011 and 2014; FLAIG 2003, chapters 2–4; BENOIST 2008; HÖLKESKAMP 2008/2017, with further references, and the contributions in ÖSTENBERG/MALMBERG/BJØRNEBYE (Eds.) 2015. Cf. on processions in general BENOIST 2008; RÜPKE 2012a; HÖLKESKAMP 2014a and 2015. Cf. on the *pompa funebris* FLAIG 1995b, 2014 and 2015; FLOWER 1996; BODEL 1999; PINA POLO 2004a and 2009; BECK 2005a and 2018; FAVRO/JOHANSEN 2010; BLASI 2012 and 2016 and the relevant contributions in HOPE/HUSKINSON (Eds.) 2011. Cf. on the triumph ITGENSHORST 2005; BEARD 2007 (with the review by K.-J. HÖLKESKAMP, in: Gnomon 82, 2010, 130–36); BASTIEN 2007; ÖSTENBERG 2009; RICH 2014; POPKIN 2016 and the contributions in LANGE/VERVAET (Eds.) 2014; on the *pompa circensis* now LATHAM 2016.

75 ECKERT 2016, chapter I.4, and LENTZSCH 2019, chapter 2, now provide comprehensive up-to-date surveys of modern theories of 'collective', 'cultural' or 'social' memory; cf. ASSMANN 1988a and b, 1992/2011 and 2000/2006; CONNERTON 1989; ERLL 2008 and the contributions in ERLL/NÜNNING (Eds.) 2008 on theories and methods of 'cultural memory studies'.

76 Cf. on Roman memory below, chapter VI, and the fundamental monograph by WALTER 2004; see also STEMMLER 2000; FLAIG 2003, chapter 4; PINA POLO 2004; RODRÍGUEZ MAYORGAS 2007a and b; EADEM 2010, 2016 and 2019; FLOWER 2009, and the relevant contributions in GALINSKY (Ed.) 2014 and IDEM (Ed.) 2016 as well as in DALLY/HÖLSCHER/MUTH/SCHNEIDER (Eds.) 2014 and in SANDBERG/SMITH (Eds.) 2018. Cf. on *exempla* and exemplarity ROLLER 2004, 2009 and 2018; BÜCHER 2006; ANDO 2015; PASCO-PRANGER 2015; LANGLANDS 2015 and 2018; JEWELL 2018. Cf. on visual media the fundamental studies by HÖLSCHER 1978, 1980a and 1990, all with further references, and also HOLLIDAY 2002. Cf. for an interesting case study on the ambivalent *memoria* of Sulla ECKERT 2016.

77 Cf. on drama as a vehicle of tradition WISEMAN 1994, 1998 and 2008, whose insistence "that the Roman historical tradition was largely created and perpetuated in dramatic performances at the Roman games (*ludi scaenici*)" (1998, ix–x) is not uncontroversial (cf. J. RICH, in: CR n. s. 45, 1995, 367–69, at 368; WALTER 2004, 75–83, especially 79–82 with n. 173; LENDON 2009, 46–49), and WISEMAN 2014, on the "rich oral-performance culture of song and story, prose and verse, drama and narrative" (62), with my rejoinder HÖLKESKAMP 2014b, where I take issue with his (I think, unnecessary) polemics against categories such as 'cultural', 'collective' and 'monumental memory'

– the strategies and media of self-representation, self-legitimization and indeed self-construction of the political class as a kind of 'meritocracy'[78] – and their gradual change through the increasing importance of other fields of self-fashioning and competition and the emergence of new strategies of distinction;[79]
– the culture-specific interconnectedness of rhetorical and performative strategies, visual media and monuments of *memoria* in the repertoire of self-fashioning of the socio-political elite in general;[80]
– the monumental *memoria* of noble *res gestae* of individual families in the dense political-sacral topography in particular.[81]

It is this latter dimension, which I call the politics of space or the spatiality of politics, which has recently taken centre stage – namely the functions and complex symbolic meanings of the urban topography of the *urbs Roma*, its political-sacral spaces and the whole spectrum of forms of interaction in these spaces, on the Forum Romanum, Comitium and Campus Martius, their importance as 'landscape of memory' and its change over time.[82] It is obvious, that the concrete aspects and dimensions of the specifically Roman republican 'political culture' mentioned above are closely and indeed inseparably interconnected – and it is this interconnectedness which constitutes the gist of the political culture paradigm.

and their theoretical underpinning. Cf. also the contributions in WISEMAN 2008 and 2015, with interesting observations on Roman 'oral' culture.

78 FLAIG 2003; BECK 2005; HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010, 108–9; 121–2; 134–5; HURLET 2012b; FLOWER 2011 and 2014; WALTER 2014a; cf. already DÖBLER 1999, chapter 1.II, and now HÖLKESKAMP 2018c, all with further references.

79 Cf. STEIN-HÖLKESKAMP 2003, 2019 and 2019a, chapter 2 and passim; see also LUNDGREEN 2019 and the general reflections in FLAIG 2019, 66–78.

80 HÖLKESKAMP 2001/2004 and below, chapter VI. Cf. on monuments, works of (Greek) art etc. and their functions in Roman culture, civic life and ideological self-definition GRUEN 1992; HÖLKESKAMP 2004/2010, 61–3, with further references. Cf. HÖLSCHER 2014, 256–62 and passim, on the concept of 'monu-mentality', and now the brilliant synthesis by DAVIES 2017 and the comparative studies by HÖLSCHER 2018, chapter 2, and IDEM 2019, chapter III.

81 HÖLKESKAMP 2016/2017; 2018b and below, chapters VII and VIII; cf. also ETCHETO 2012, 77–84 and passim. Cf. the groundbreaking contributions by HÖLSCHER 1978, 1980a and b, 1984, 1987/2004, 1990, 1992, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2019, 2014, 2015, 2018 and 2019, which combine innovative fundamental theoretical and methodological reflections with empirical studies of monument classes, individual monuments and their spatial context. Cf. also FLOWER 2006a and ROLLER 2010a on "demolished houses" and other "memory sanctions".

82 DAVIES 2013 and 2017; EVANS 2013; POPKIN 2016; RUSSELL 2016; RODRÍGUEZ MAYORGAS 2019. Cf. already FAVRO 1988, 1994 and 2014; DÖBLER 1999, chapter 1.I; BASTIEN 2000; ZECCHINI 2009a and the contributions in GARCÍA MORCILLO/RICHARDSON/SANTANGELO (Eds.) 2016 and in BORLENGHI/CHILLET/HOLLARD/LOPEZ-RABATEL/MORETTI (Eds.) 2019 on "les lieux". Cf. on the Forum Romanum (as well as on theoretical and methodological approaches) MUTH 2009, 2012 and 2014; cf. now the fundamental comparative study by HÖLSCHER 2018, chapter 1 and passim.

To quote WINSTON CHURCHILL'S famous speech on 10 November 1942 once again: This is not the end, it is not even the beginning of the end, it is perhaps the end of the beginning[83] – after all, there is certainly no consensus about the issues raised in this introduction. However, the renewed 'elitist' approach to Roman republican politics, as it were, reformed and modernized by the 'political-culture paradigm' seems to have become an acceptable, accepted and serious alternative to both, the old elitist orthodoxy as well as the new radicalism. Quite a few recent general surveys of Roman republican history, politics and political order refer to it as a matter of course.[84]

83 HÖLKESKAMP 2004, 7; 277 with n. 55 and Addenda; IDEM 2004/2010, chapter 9 ("An End of the Beginning"); IDEM 2017, 7.

84 DAVID 2000; ROSENSTEIN 2010, chapter 1; STEEL 2013, chapter 8 and passim; WALTER 2017, chapters I.5, II.5 and III.5, with references; MOURITSEN 2017, 94–99; HURLET 2014, quoted by HUMM 2018, 100–1.