

# A b s t r a c t s

## Chekists and Siloviki

### The Pillars of Power in Russia

Margarete Klein, Nils Holger Schreiber  
War and Militarisation  
Notes on Russian Domestic and Foreign Policy

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is the result of a militarisation of foreign policy that has been evident since 2008. This was accompanied by a domestic militarisation process that has intensified greatly over the course of the year. Since the failure of the planned campaign for quick conquest, the entirety of Russian society has been geared towards war. Nonetheless, the country's capability to make up for the army's high losses remains limited. The failures in Ukraine to date not only reduce Russia's ability to project power in other conflicts in the post-Soviet space and beyond. It also undermines the regime's legitimacy. But this will not bring an end to the war against Ukraine. Rather, the survival of the regime depends on success in the war. It will use all means available to conventional and hybrid warfare to win.

Hans-Henning Schröder  
Not a Bit of Peace  
War and Negotiations. A Contribution to the Discussion

Russia's war against Ukraine is in its second year. Militarily, Ukraine cannot win the war against Russia. But a Russian victory is also unlikely because the West supports Ukraine. It will come down to negotiations to end this war. The leadership around Putin is not ready for this. It will engage in negotiations only if Ukraine is able to repel Russia's spring offensive and bring pressure to bear on the attacking forces. After that, an extensive negotiation process will be necessary, during which a ceasefire and its monitoring will have to be determined, as well as the status of occupied Ukrainian territories. As during the CSCE process in the 1970s, this will require staying power, confidence building, negotiations at several levels, and the involvement of indirect warring parties such as the United States, the members of the European Union, Turkey, and China. The aim will be to restore Ukraine's territorial status quo ante within the framework of a new European security order.

## Western Intelligence Services and Russia's War against Ukraine An Interview with Georg Mascolo

Russia's war against Ukraine has confronted Western intelligence services with an emergency scenario. Their skills and capabilities for gaining information about Russia's intentions and the military situation are being put to the test. The intelligence services' successes can help win the war. Their failures contribute to losing the war. Western intelligence services are supporting Ukraine with their findings, helping with logistics, and monitoring sanctions. The German Federal Intelligence Service (BND) is considered a institution unto itself when it comes to gathering intelligence about Russia. At the same time, it faces shortcomings as an intelligence service. In the political decision-making process, it plays a subordinate role. Confrontation with Russia will continue after the war as well. Understanding what the Kremlin is thinking and planning remains crucial.

## Andreas Hilger From the Cheka to the FSB A Short History of Moscow's Intelligence Services

Russia's intelligence services are rooted in the tradition of their Soviet predecessors. In 1917, there was the Cheka – the “Extraordinary Commission for the Struggle against Counter-Revolution, Speculation, and Sabotage”. Despite historic watershed moments such as de-Stalinization or the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the continuities in bureaucratic organisation, the services' position in the political system, and their self-image and their view of the world are striking. The Chekists see themselves in a permanent struggle against internal and external enemies. However, despite their considerable material resources and privileged access to power, the services were unable to prevent the collapse of the Soviet Union or provide a solution to the socio-economic, technological, and political problems facing today's Russia.

## Mark Galeotti (In)visible hand Russia's intelligence services in action abroad

Russia's intelligence services are more than intelligence agencies that gather information. They are executive organs. Their mission is to disrupt, distract, and demoralize. They act in concert on behalf of the state leadership and at the same time compete for the president's favour. They execute his orders, but also strive to influence his world view. Their increasingly ruthless actions since 2014 anticipated Russia's attack on Ukraine.

**Markus Wehner**  
**The Tiergarten Murder: A Reconstruction**  
**Russian State Terrorism in Germany**

On 23 August 2019, Selimkhan Khangoshvili, a Georgian citizen of Chechen nationality, was shot dead in the Kleiner Tiergarten park in Berlin. The perpetrator was caught. He was traveling under a fake identity and, as it later turned out, was an employee of the Russian intelligence service FSB. The victim had fought Russian forces as a field commander during the Second Chechen War. The perpetrator was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder at the end of 2021, with the court establishing a particular burden of guilt, as requested by Germany's federal prosecutor. The court spoke of state terrorism and assigned the role of principal to President Vladimir Putin. The German government reacted to the state-sponsored contract killing by expelling four diplomats.

**Reiner Haunreiter**  
**Shield and Sword 2.0**  
**Russia's Special Services Abroad**

The Federal Security Service (FSB), the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the Military Intelligence Service (GRU) are important instruments of rule in Russia. They serve to preserve the system at home and assert Russian interests abroad. GRU and FSB operations in Europe, including assassinations and murders, have drawn global attention. After Russia's attack on Ukraine, hundreds of agents were expelled from the European Union. This number serves to indicate the strong presence of these services in the EU. Germany and the EU lack effective counter-espionage measures. At the same time, contact with Russia's services should be re-established.

**Jan Claas Behrends**  
**Chekest, Statist, Imperialist**  
**Notes on Vladimir Putin's Self-Image**

Vladimir Putin is a model representative of the Chekist world view. This view is characterised by friend-foe thinking, paranoia, and xenophobia, as well as a fixation on the authoritarian power-state as a prerequisite for Russia's status as an imperial great power. By this logic, the employment of "active measures" and the use of violence, including murder, to assert one's own interests are legitimate. Analysis of early sources shows that there never was a "liberal Putin".

Andreas Heinemann-Grüder  
Russia's Irregular Armies  
The "Wagner" Example

The importance of irregular military companies in Russia's policy to extend its influence has increased since the annexation of Crimea and the war against Ukraine in 2014-2015. Russia's military companies are an expression of how business and siloviki have merged to form so-called "silo-archs". They are the Russian regime's shock troops for ousting Western powers and pro-Western politicians in the Middle East and Africa. At the same time, they are war profiteers and serve as task forces for missions involving increased risk and a need for secrecy. These military companies act in coordination with the Ministry of Defence, the FSB, the Foreign Intelligence Service, and the presidential administration in the Kremlin. Thus, they are not private. They practice an exterminatory way of war that is based on and further develops experience gained in the Chechen wars.

Michael Rochlitz  
A Future Gambled Away  
Russia's Economy under Pressure from Intelligence Services

Russia's economy has been stagnant since 2008. Under the interim presidency of Dmitry Medvedev from 2008 to 2011, there were attempts to modernise the economy. Since Vladimir Putin's return to the presidency in March 2012, economic growth has ceased to be a priority. Instead, a small group of intelligence officers around President Putin has relied on repression to control society and manage confrontation with the West. With the war in Ukraine, this development has reached a new zenith. The long-term economic consequences for Russia are catastrophic.

Ulrich Schmid  
Stierlitz and His Grandsons  
Russia's Intelligence Services in Literature and Film

Most recently, the work of the intelligence services has gained in importance as a source of material for cultural productions in Russia. As the Putin regime hardens its political course, the image of the intelligence services in Russian society is increasingly being cast in a positive light. New television series follow a dual line of tradition. On the one hand, the cult series "17 Moments of Spring" pursues a style-defining function. On the other hand, viewing habits rooted in Hollywood are also taken into account. A critical literary or cinematic examination of the various intelligence services' activities is not possible in Russia at present.

Valerii V'iugin  
Make Love, Not War  
Russian spy comedies, 1990s–2010s

The spy comedy is a rather new and rare genre, which began developing in Russia only in the 1990s. It reflects the spirit of political opening, the end of the Cold War, but also deeper continuities. In these films, confrontation between the blocs, especially between the United States and the Soviet Union or Russia, dissolves into friendship or friendly rivalry. Often a love story is in the foreground. At the same time, constants such as the image of Dzerzhinsky, the founder of the Soviet intelligence service, show that the authorities of the past have not been buried. The films' different approaches to these constants reveal the social and political climate of their times.

Julie Fedor, George Fforde  
Research on the KGB  
A Compass for the Archives and the Literature

The legacy of the KGB, the Soviet intelligence service, shapes Russia's domestic and foreign policy. Institutional structures have been preserved, values and worldviews have been passed down from one generation to the next, as are techniques of infiltration, disinformation, and assassination. Ukraine, which has the largest KGB holdings outside of Russia, and the Baltic states have opened up their archives, thus making new sources from the period 1954-1991 available to scholars and the public. This has sparked a veritable archival revolution. The new findings about the Soviet intelligence services also serve as background knowledge for analysing contemporary Russian politics.